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FREEDOM OF THE CITY: CANADIAN
CITIES AND THE QUEST FOR
GOVERNMENTAL STATUS©
RON LEVI* & MARIANA VALVERDE**
Until recently, Canadian cities were limited to the legal
powers explicitly prescribed by provinces (the U.S.-
based Dillon's Rule). Despite much talk about a "new
deal for cities," recent changes to municipal legislation
do little to empower municipalities to define and
govern local problems, although courts appear
somewhat willing to expand the scope of cities'
authority. Through two case studies involving the City
of Toronto, we demonstrate that even after the
overhaul of provincial municipal acts, cities still lack
the necessary legal tools and the legal flexibility to
respond to pressing urban needs.
Jusque tout rfcemment, les villes canadiennes ne
d~tenaient que les pouvoirs lgaux que prescrivaient
explicitement les provinces (la r~gle Dillon
am~ricaine). Malgr6 beaucoup de d~bats sur une
nouvelle donne pour les villes, les recents changements
de la legislation municipale en font peu pour habiliter
les municipalites A d6finir et A administrer les
problmes Iocaux, m~me si les tribunaux semblent
quelque peu disposes A 6tendre l'envergure de
l'autoritd dont disposent les villes. Au travers de deux
Etudes de cas impliquant la ville de Toronto, nous
dfmontrons que mme apres la refonte des lois sur les
municipalit~s, il manque encore aux villes les outils
juridiques n6cessaires, ainsi que la souplesse juridique
qui leur permettra de r~agir aux besoins urbains
pressants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"City air," according to a medieval principle, "makes one free."'
And, in the legal context of Western medieval cities, this was certainly
the case: serfs who escaped to cities were deemed, by living within city
walls for specified periods of time, to have acquired their freedom.' This
link between cities and personal freedom continues to enjoy cultural
currency and is at the core of Gerald Frug's celebrated analysis in City
Making3 In a historical overview of city governance, from the medieval
European town to nineteenth-century U.S. cities, Frug stresses the link
between city autonomy and the communal interests and freedoms of
residents.4 But current legal governance affords U.S. cities limited
' For more on this principle of Stadtluft Macht Frei, see generally "City" Encyclopedia
Britannica 2006, online: Encyclopedia Britannica Online <http://O-www.search.eb.com.library.uor.
edu:80/eb/article-61361>; Fritz R6rig, The Medieval Town (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967) at 27; John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations" (1993) 47 Int'l Organization 139 at 155; and Max Weber, The City, ed. and
trans. by Don Martindale & Gertrud Neuwirth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958).
2 Weber, ibid. at 94, where Weber discusses the principle of "City air makes man free," in
which "the lord of a slave or bondsman lost the right to subordinate him to his power."
Gerald E. Frug, City Making. Building Communities Without Building Walls (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999).
4 Ibid. at 26-53.
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political power, a model that Frug laments, along with the lack of
regional cooperation it fosters among cities and their residents.
In the Canadian context, struggles over the legal powers of cities
are daily political issues. With Canadian cities enjoying even less
freedom than the U.S. cities that Frug studies, it is not surprising that
the scope of city authority is central to the domestic political agenda.
What is surprising, however, is the dearth of close empirical examination
of the current legal architecture of city governance. With ongoing
disputes over the legal tools available to Canadian cities-and a
potential "new deal for cities" that often emerges on the political
horizon-such an investigation is particularly timely.
Rather than focus on normative questions of city autonomy and
citizen freedom, we adopt a socio-legal approach, which documents the
current political and legal configurations of municipal governance. We
aim to investigate city freedom from a perspective that is often taken up
in media reports, but generally ignored in academic research on
municipal law-namely, the extent to which available legal tools allow
Canadian cities to be responsive to current social problems. Whether or
not city air makes us free, we investigate the coritests over governmental
autonomy that are waged in and through municipal law. We do so
through an analysis of the legal inheritance of Canadian cities, the
current legal regime, and the ongoing demands for legal change that are
already being generated within the Canadian urban landscape.
This article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, we briefly outline
the current political and legal context of Canadian municipal
governance, and introduce the "new deal for cities," which has occupied
the urban agenda over the past decade. In Parts III and IV, we closely
analyze the doctrinal and statutory backdrop against which Canadian
municipal law is set. We trace the status of Canadian cities as mere
"creatures of the provinces" and discuss contemporary efforts by courts
and legislatures to reconsider the scope of cities' authority in governing
urban affairs. We then explore the tensions surrounding municipal
autonomy through two case studies-the need for housing shelters to
address homelessness, and the ambition of Canadian cities to compete
with "global cities"-that reflect the array of political issues that test the
legal powers of cities in everyday political and legal venues. Finally, we
outline the potential benefits and pitfalls of current and proposed
models for Canadian legal city governance. Rather than propose
normative solutions based on models of individual or municipal
autonomy, we adopt a genealogical stance in order to trace the debates
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taking place and the legal architecture in which they are occurring.' This
approach highlights the twists, turns, and contestations that are already
determining the extent of city freedom in our time.
II. THE SHORT-LIVED "NEW DEAL FOR CITIES": THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN URBAN GOVERNANCE
For about ten years there has been significant political agitation
around urban issues; for example, the forced merger of municipal
governments in Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax has led to
unprecedented public interest in urban governance.6 By the 2004 federal
election campaign, this interest led to the adoption of a "new deal for
cities." The concerns underwriting this political agitation had been
presaged in an earlier report to the Federation of Canadian
Municipalities (FCM):
The powers and resources of municipalities derive from the 1849 Baldwin Act of Canada
and the distribution of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867. Municipal functions,
responsibilities and duties have changed dramatically since 1849 and 1867. There are a
number of trends which are giving rise to the need for more municipal autonomy, powers
and resources. These trends include federal and provincial disengagement from services
(described as decentralization, offloading, and abdication of responsibility); provincial
grant reductions; rapid growth rates in some urban centres; the need for infrastructure
upgrades; and demands and needs for new services that were not contemplated in the
mid 1800s.
7
When this report was written in 2001, the federal government
had largely ignored the new urban poverty and associated governance
problems by considering them as provincial issues or charity matters. By
2003, however, the political winds were changing, as demonstrated by a
s On the insights that can be garnered through such an analysis, and the relationship of
genealogical analyses of law to potential law reform efforts, see Mariana Valverde et al,
Democracy in Governanc. A Socio-Legal Framework (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada,
1999).
6 Andrew Sancton, "Why Municipal Amalgamations? Halifax, Toronto, Montreal" (Paper
prepared for a conference on "Municipal-Provincial-Federal Relations in Canada," Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 9-10 May 2003), online: Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations <http://www.iigr.ca/conferences/archive/pdfs4/Sancton.pdf>.
' Donald Lidstone, "Municipal Autonomy" (Report presented to the Communities in an
Urban Century Symposium, 20 October 2001) [unpublished] as cited in Federation of Canadian
Municipalities (FCM), "Communities in an Urban Century: Symposium Report" (January 2002) at
4 [FCM, "Urban Century"].
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task force headed by Toronto MP Judy Sgro.8 The task force's report
was hailed as a belated recognition of the crises plaguing urban
communities. These crises included a lack of affordable housing due to
the cessation of federal housing programs, increases in homelessness
and other manifestations of poverty due to stringent welfare rules and
cuts in welfare rates, and automobile congestion and transit problems
caused by provincial cutbacks and downloading. Fundamentally, the
Sgro report recognized that cities lacked the necessary tools to address
these crises.9
While it became clear that cities could soon expect increased
funding, it was equally evident that they would only obtain lukewarm
support for their parallel campaign to be recognized as a level of
government. John Godfrey, as the "Parliamentary Secretary to the
Prime Minister with a special emphasis on cities," gave a speech to the
big city mayors in which he compared the federal government's decision
to take up the slogan "a new deal for cities" to Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's New Deal. (Godfrey promised the bank presidents in the
room that he would not imitate Roosevelt in closing the banks.)'0
Godfrey's only concrete offering, however, was a new cities secretariat
within the Privy Council Office. In trying to persuade the mayors that
Prime Minister Paul Martin supported the cities agenda, all Godfrey
could muster was a rather slippery quote in which Martin had stated
that "the cities agenda, the municipal agenda-both large and small-is
at the heart of the federal government's priorities.""
Martin's substitution of "municipalities" for "cities" would
presage further dilution of the cities agenda. Fiscal reform ensued,
including an announcement that GST would no longer be charged on
8 Liberal Party of Canada, Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues, Canada's
Urban Strategy. A Blueprint for Action (Ottawa: Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues,
2002) (Chair: Judy Sgro).
' See e.g. Canadian Institute of Planners, "Framework for an Urban Strategy for Canada"
(Submission to the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues, 12 March 2002), online:
Manitoba Professional Planners Institute <http://www.mppi.mb.ca/documents/CIP-urbantaskforce
/framework.pdf#search= %22%22Framework%20for%20an%20Urban%20Strategy%20for%2OCa
nada%22%22>; Denis Wong, Cities at the Crossroads. Addressing Intergovernmental Structures
for Western Canada's Cities (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 2002).
"°John Godfrey, "A New Deal for Canadian Cities" (Speech presented to Big City Mayors
Meeting, Toronto, 22 January 2004) [unpublished], online: localgovernment.ca <http://www.
localgovernment.ca/show-libary.cfm?id= 111>.
11 Ibid.
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municipal goods and services.'" But the.slow political progress was
evident when it was announced that federal gas tax funds would be
transferred to municipalities-despite being designed to fund mass
transit in big cities, this reform was detached from the "city agenda."' 3
In the federal government's new language, this was part of helping
"communities," not cities as such. Canada's largest circulation daily
newspaper responded that "cities need to see a truly 'new deal"':
Martin has missed the point of a new deal for cities. He has adopted the language of new
deal advocates but applies it to policies designed to benefit every community, no matter
how small. True, villages and hamlets across the country, native reserves, and Prince
Edward Island farmers have serious needs ... . Clearly they deserve federal funding to
help themselves rebuild, but not under the auspices of a new deal for cities.14
This shift from "a new deal for cities" to "a new deal for
communities" (also exemplified in the new title then given to John
Godfrey, Minister of State for Infrastructure and Communities15) is
regarded as unfortunate by urban activists. 6
It is important to note that the federal reluctance to recognize
the distinct problems of cities may, in turn, precipitate further political
and legal difficulties for Canadian cities. At one level, these federal
manoeuvres may lend new force to the long-standing reluctance of
provinces to recognize the distinct situation of cities, a reluctance that is
already resented in Ontario and other provinces." But this federal shift
away from the cities agenda may also encourage increased competition
amongst Canadian cities. A notable example is the City of Toronto,
which, as we discuss in Part III, below, is presently pursuing more
flexible and powerful legal powers independently through the City of
12 Debates of the Senate of Canada (Hansard), No. 141 (2 February 2004) (Rt. Hon.
Adrienne Clarkson), online: Debates of the Senate (Hansard) <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3
/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/00ldb_2004-02-02-E.htm?Language = E&Parl=37&Ses=3>.
I3 lbid.
14 "Cities need to see a truly 'new deal'," Editorial, Toronto Star (4 January 2005) A14.
"- P.C. 2004-844, C. Gaz. 2004.11.1182.
16 See John Sewell, "Cities getting the rug pulled" Eye Weekly (1 April 2004), online:
<http://www.eyeweekly.com/eye/issue/issue 04.01.0/city/citystate.php>; John Sewell, "Bulletin No.
45," (March 2004), online: localgovernment.ca <http://www.localgovernment.ca/show_
bulletin.cfm?id=118>. Glen Murray argues that the federal plan will slow the decline of major
centres, not end it. See Glen Murray, "How cities lost the 'New Deal' Toronto Star (3 July 2005)
A17.
17See e.g. Wong, supra note 9.
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Toronto Act.'" This independence may have unfortunate consequences
for other Ontario cities that were hoping to derive legal and political
benefits from a broad governmental initiative. In this way, the combined
federal and provincial failure to recognize cities as legally, economically,
and socially distinct from other municipalities may produce a handful of
politically powerful cities who will receive a special legal deal from their
provincial governments,' 9 while others are consigned to the small-town
category. In turn, municipalities as a group may find it increasingly
difficult to press their case, either provincially or federally."0
III. THE NEW MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION
A. Dillon's Rule and its Decline
The "Dillon's Rule" doctrine of municipal government, which
maintains that municipalities are merely the "creatures of the
province,"" presents one of the most significant legal challenges for city
reform. Although the origin of this rule is found in nineteenth-century
U.S. law, it was most recently upheld by the 1993 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Greenbaum.22 As we discuss in this
Part, however, Dillon's Rule has been losing significant ground in
Canadian courts ever since Greenbaum.
In Greenbaum, a Toronto sidewalk vendor successfully
challenged a city bylaw that limited vending permits to businesses
immediately abutting the sidewalk. Greenbaum argued that this bylaw
'sS.O. 1997, c. 2.
19 Examples of this include Winnipeg and Vancouver. For more on the relationship
between these cities and their provincial governments, see e.g. Chief Administrative Officer, City of
Toronto, "The relationship of 5 Canadian cities and their provinces" (Report prepared by the Chief
Administrative Officer, 5 September 2000, updated October 2001), online: Canada's Cities
<http://www.canadascities.ca/caoreport_092000.htm>. For more on Winnipeg's "new deal" in
particular, see John Sewell, "Bulletin No. 40," (October 2003), online: localgovernment.ca
<http://www.localgovernment.ca/showbulletin.cfm?id= 103>.
20 This is particularly the case outside of British Columbia, which in recent years has
provided some flexibility for city-specific legislation through the Community Charter, S.B.C. 2003,
c. 26.
21 Frug, supra note 3 at 26-53; R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674 at 687-89
[Greenbaum]; Stanley Makuch, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1983)
at 115; and Warren Magnusson, "Are Municipalities Creatures of the Provinces?" (2005) 39 J. Can.
Stud. 5 at 21-22.
22 Greenbaum, ibid
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forced him to sell t-shirts without a permit.23 And indeed, the Court
determined that once the city decided to make sidewalk space available
to vendors, such permits had to be generally available.24 In reaching this
conclusion-and in chastising Toronto for passing an illegal bylaw-
Justice lacobucci approvingly cited a passage from a planning law
textbook25 which 'indicated that Dillon's U.S.-based rule has been
adopted in Canada. This rule established the doctrine of "prescribed
powers": that municipalities are merely delegates of a proper (state or
provincial) government, and thus able to act only if and when expressly
authorized by statute. As Justice lacobucci stated in Greenbaum:
The courts, as a result of this inferior legal position [of municipalities], have traditionally
interpreted narrowly statutes respecting grants of powers to municipalities. This
approach may be described as 'Dillon's rule,' which states that a municipality may
exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily or
fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable powers
essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes of the
corporation.
26
In practice, this has meant that municipalities must run to the
provincial legislatures for amendments to already long and complex
general purpose municipal acts-and they must do so whenever a new
issue emerges that requires either prohibition or regulation. As former
23 It is worth noting that Greenbaum was later appointed to the Toronto Licensing
Tribunal, an unlikely fate for an unlicensed vendor who litigated against the city up to the Supreme
Court.
24 Other legal issues complicated the situation, such as whether sidewalk vending
constituted a public nuisance. See Greenbaum, supra note 21 at 689-92.
' Makuch, supra note 21.
26 Greenbaum, supra note 21 at 688-89. In addition, reference is sometimes made to
Attorney- Generalfor Ontario v. Attorney- General of the Dominion, [1896] A.C. 348 (P.C.), part of
a line of cases on how the federal and provincial governments would divide the labour of restricting
or banning alcohol sales. The Law Lords clarified that federal statutes take precedence in conflicts
with provincial legislation; hence, localities that adopted the local-option provisions of the
Dominion Temperance Act (S.C. 1864, c. 18) were not subject to similar provincial legislation. In
addition, the Law Lords stated that provinces could only delegate to municipalities those powers
specifically delineated as provincial in the British North -America Act (now called the Constitution
Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [Constitution Act
186). Nowhere, however, did this decision state that municipalities could not exercise their
traditional powers to pass general regulatory bylaws (e.g. about public nuisances or disorderly
taverns) in fields of provincial jurisdiction. Instead, the issue focused on whether liquor sales,
importation, or manufacture could be altogether prohibited by a provincial legislature (and in turn,
the authority enjoyed by municipal institutions, to whom provincial powers could be delegated. See
Attorne- Generalfor Ontario v. Attorne- General of the Dominion, Watson, L.J.).
[VOL. 44, No. 3
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Toronto mayor John Sewell indicates, explicit permission must be
obtained from the province for every stoplight that municipal traffic
authorities want to erect.27 Similarly, cities cannot license new types of
businesses-even if they present the same public order problems as
existing licensed businesses-since their powers are restricted to long,
but not particularly rational, lists of businesses traditionally requiring a
licence.
As a result, the haphazard process by which lists of prescribed
municipal powers are drawn up and changed results in absurd
situations. 28 Interviews conducted by the authors with City of Toronto
policy staff and urban policy experts reveal that the Ontario Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing has usually been willing to comply with
simple requests for amendments facilitating changes in local bylaws.29
Yet it is clear that city legal and policy staff and municipal politicians
resent being unable to exercise their judgment even in minor matters.30
And, in fact, municipal requests for legal changes are not always
granted. For instance, in the field of environmental protection, Ontario
is unwilling to allow municipalities to set higher environmental
standards, thus blocking local moves to protect greenbelts and
moraines.3
Even in Western Canada, where new municipal acts have been
implemented, there continues to be wide dissatisfaction with provincial
paternalism. As Denis Wong, a policy analyst for the Canada West
Foundation, documents, a key frustration is that provinces consult
municipalities only if and when they want to:
27 John Sewell, A New City Agenda (Toronto: Zephyr Press, 2004).
28 For instance, more than five years after. amalgamation, no unified licensing bylaw has
been elaborated in the merged city of Ottawa. Business owners who wonder why doughnut shops or
home businesses need a licence on one side of the road, but not on the other, are unlikely to obtain
a rational answer.
29 This is borne out by several interviews with municipal licensing and standards officials,
conducted over 2004 and 2005, in which the respondents were promised confidentiality.
30 To an outside observer, the paternalism evident in this area of Canadian law appears to
have few parallels outside of the old colonial relations enshrined in the pre-1985 Indian Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. 1-6.
"' Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 116 (21
November 2001) (Ms. Carol Seglins), online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/french/hansard/committee
_debates/37_parl/Session2/gengov/g016.htm#P675_229324>.
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The provincial government has full control over the types of revenues that cities can
generate .... A second point of dissatisfaction with the provincial-municipal status quo is
the lack of an adequate municipal voice in provincial urban policies and programs.
Although many city respondents applaud existing consultations with their provincial
government as a positive step ... they contend that the consultative process needs
improvement. The fact that existing consultations are carried out on an ad hoc basis does
not provide provincial governments and city authorities with sufficient time and
opportunity to address core urban issues. The lack of systematic consultation also
hinders any follow up on previous decisions. An additional problem city respondents
identified is that "the cities' voices are not always heard."32
The doctrine of prescribed powers, then, is the main block
standing in the way of municipal autonomy, and of modern and liberal
provincial-municipal relations. Since Dillon's name is invoked to
authorize the "prescribed powers" doctrine, as well as paternalistic and
irrational processes more broadly (in Canada as in the United States), 33
it is worthwhile to consider Dillon's project.
John Dillon's Commentaries on the Law of Municipal
Corporations first appeared in 1872,"4 at a time in U.S. history when
there was a strong middle class backlash against city councils. At the
time, councils were regarded as bodies too willing to spend money on
questionable projects, in particular on railways. In this context, the jurist
John Dillon became an ardent spokesperson for the cause of ratepayers,
and especially business ratepayers. Dillon contemplated restricting
aldermanic posts to the wealthy by reintroducing a property
qualification for municipal office, but rejected this as unsuitable to a
democracy. 35 His alternative solution to the problems of municipal
corruption and largesse-problems that did not exist in all cities, but
which his treatise regards as universal-was to bind cities more tightly to
state governments. Claiming the authority of the renowned Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts (though quoting a passage which does not actually set
out the doctrine of prescribed powers),36 and creating a sense of crisis by
claiming, without authority, that municipal debts throughout the United
32 Wong, supra note 9 at 4.
3
.Frug, supra note 3.
4 It was first published as Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations (Chicago: J.
Cockcroft, 1872).
3 John Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 3d ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) vol. 1 at 22-24.
36 Ibid at 116.
[VOL. 44, NO. 3
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States amounted to a billion dollars,37 Dillon claimed to "find" in
existing American law support for his own argument about the need to
restrain city councils.
On a close reading, one finds that Dillon's concerns were mainly
fiscal, because he argued that municipal powers relating to investment
should only be used with express permission from the legislature.
(Dillon thought the legislature was less corrupt and more amenable to
the interests of large ratepayers.) In contrast, Dillon continued to
acknowledge the existence of another set of discretionary municipal
public order powers, which are enjoyed by U.S. municipalities through
statute and common law, and for which "all the inhabitants have an
equal interest and should have an equal voice."38 This is the "police
power of the state,, '' and, for Dillon, these discretionary and non-
enumerated powers to obtain and preserve health, morality, and order
remain firmly within the scope of municipalities (as long as no
investment in infrastructure or in new ventures is involved),4" despite
their logic being the opposite of the "prescribed powers" doctrine for
which he is famous. As a result, the local municipal power to regulate
urban disorder is not questioned by Dillon. In the judicial review of
municipal actions, he advocated that courts should construe the text of
municipal powers strictly;4" nowhere did he advocate narrowing the
scope of permissible municipal action in this domain.
3 7 Ibid. at 24.
3
9 Ibid. at 23.
3 Markus D. Dubber, The Police Power Patriarchy and the Foundations of American
Government (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); William J. Novak, The People's
Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1996).
o Without much comment, Dillon notes that state laws often empower municipalities "to
make all by-laws that may be necessary to preserve the peace, good order and internal police" of
communities (Dillon, supra note 33 at 364) or, variously, "health, good government and welfare"
(ibid. at 374) or "peace and good order" (ibid. at 391, 402-03). These powers had existed for
centuries, exercised in England by municipal corporations, statutory authorities, and local
magistrates, both through their criminal court function and otherwise (e.g. licensing). In the United
States this police power was, and continues to be, exercised by a variety of political and legal bodies,
including municipalities and inter-municipal regulatory bodies such as port authorities. Our reading
of Dillon leads us to conclude that for Dillon, the municipal exercise of these discretionary, un-
enumerated police powers, even when exercised against businesses, is uncontroversial.
" Novak, supra note 39.
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Given its political and legal heritage, Canada could certainly
have avoided adopting Dillon's doctrine of prescribed powers.4" But at
least some Canadian officials in the nineteenth century appeared
enamoured with the presumed urban similarities between U.S. and
Canadian cities;43 and when the U.S. railway craze (and its associated
municipal indebtedness) hit Canada,' the Ontario Railway and
Municipal Board-ancestor of today's OMB (Ontario Municipal
Board)-was created in 1906 for the same reasons that motivated
Dillon's recommendations. 5 During this time, Canadian provinces all
continued to rely on versions of the 1849 Baldwin Act 46 as general-
purpose municipal statutes.47 And throughout, Dillon's doctrine-or
rather, a second-hand version of some of his concerns-generally
42 Dillon's project was mainly to ensure that municipal councils did not make financial
commitments binding property owners for years to come, as railway-crazy city councils were
sometimes doing; and, secondarily, to ensure that municipal powers, especially in the area of taxes
and licensing fees, would be narrowly construed by courts. See Dillon, supra note 35 at 20-21. This
was relatively easy to do in the United States, where states are indeed the site of sovereignty.
Canada, however, had both a stronger federal government and more direct links to the English
tradition of local magistrate decision making and local autonomy exercised through special-purpose
boards and commissions. For instance, the Webbs' history of local government emphasizes that
through the industrialization process much regulatory work was done in England not by municipal
corporations-which did not cover much of the country even after the 1835 Municipal
Corporations Act-but by "special purpose authorities," the ancestors of today's Canadian
"agencies, boards and commissions." These authorities often wielded tremendous powers, e.g. to
levy fees and regulate transportation. Sidney Webb & Beatrice P. Webb, The Manor and the
Borough (London: Frank Cass, 1963).
43 See Engin F. Isin, "Rethinking the Origins of Canadian Municipal Government" (1995) 4
Can. J. Urb. Research 73 at 76. Isin notes that the Ontario commissioners charged in the 1880s with
examining municipal governance and proposing legal reforms assumed that "the circumstances of
the people of that country [United States] more nearly resemble our own in urban and rural
districts, and we may reasonably conclude that whatever works satisfactorily amongst them is not
wholly unsuited to us."
4 In 1887-1888, Ontario appointed a Commission on Municipal Corporations, whose own
historical research remains the best source on the subject. See Ontario, Legislative Assembly,
"Second Report of the Municipal Commission" in Sessional Papers, No. 13 (1889).
'- Warren Magnusson, "Toronto" in Warren Magnusson & Andrew Sancton, eds., City
Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) 94 at 106-07. Provinces also
undertook other projects that undermined municipal business ambitions, especially in the utilities
field. See Christopher Armstrong & H.V. Nelles, Monopoly's Moment. The Organization and
Regulation of Canadian Utilities, 1830-1930(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).
4S.Prov.C. 1849, c. 81.
"' See generally C. Andrew, "Provincial-Municipal Relations; or Hyper-Fractionalized
Quasi-Subordination Revisited" in James Lightbody, ed., Canadian Metropolitics. Governing Our
Cities (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995) 137; C.R. Tindal & S. Nobes Tindal, Local Government in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1984) at 11-33.
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floated above Canadian law, ready to be invoked whenever cities tried to
go beyond their traditional powers.48
A contemporary example of how ideas about Dillon's doctrine-
that cities are no more than "creatures of the province"-are used to
define the powers of Canadian cities can be found in the 1997 decision
of the Ontario Superior Court in East York v. Ontario (Attorney
General).49 For advocates of expansive city power, this decision
enshrines a "most vicious" reliance on the argument that municipalities
do not enjoy autonomous status. 50
The case arose from a constitutional challenge to the City of
Toronto Act 1997, which provided for the creation of Toronto's
"megacity" in 1998.51 Although indicating that it "may be that the
government displayed megachutzpah" in its megacity pursuit 5 2 -
particularly since there is no evidence of any reports, commissions, draft
bills, position papers, or public hearings before the first reading of the
legislative bill, and in referenda substantial numbers of people voted
against this change53-the Superior Court concluded that this did not
exceed the province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to
municipal institutions in the province.54 Drawing on early twentieth-
century cases of the Supreme Court and Privy Council, the court
determined that the power to restructure Toronto is within provincial
authority under section 92(8), and laid out four general propositions
regarding the constitutional status of Canadian cities:
4 8See e.g. Gordon L. Clark, Judges and the Cities- Interpreting LocalAutonomy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 118.
- (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 789 (Gen. Div.) [East Yorkj, aff'd (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 733 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1998] 1 S.C.R. vii [East York S.C.C.].
'Sewell, supra note 27 at 76.
1 Constitutional challenges were brought under s. 92 of the Constitution Act 1867(that the
province did not have the authority to restructure Toronto, or must consult with the municipality by
constitutional convention), and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter]. The
Court dismissed the Charter claims, noting that "there is nlothing in the Charter which provides
constitutional status to municipalities." East York, supra note 49 at 799.
52 East York, ibid. at 804.
53 Ibid. at 795-97.
s4 Ibid at 798-99; Constitution Act 1867, supra note 26, s. 92(8).
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It is clear from the judicial and academic authorities referred to in the respondent's
factum that there are four principles which apply to the constitutional status of municipal
governments:
(i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status;
(ii) municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial
legislation so provides;
(iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are
subject to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation;
(iv) municipal institutions may exercise only those powers which are conferred upon
them by statute."
While some of the cases cited by the court have less to do with
the constitutional status of cities and more to do with the limits on
provincial legislatures to delegate,56 earlier Canadian decisions do
support the position that cities are without independent authority.57 The
decision of the Superior Court was upheld by the Ontario Court of
Appeal's reading of section 92(8), and an application for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed without reasons in April
1998.58
Despite this decision in the Toronto amalgamation case, a
serious attack on the Canadian version of Dillon's doctrine was
successfully launched starting in the mid-1990s. A campaign swept
through Canadian legislatures which entailed an overhaul of the basic
legislative structure for municipal government. The Alberta Municipal
Government Act of 1994"9 was the first to be passed, and many of its
provisions (including the granting of powers in a non-prescribed
manner, through "spheres of jurisdiction" rather than specific objects of
governance) were replicated throughout Canada. Yukon Territory,
Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Ontario all passed
new municipal statutes between 1994 and 2001.60
The Alberta Municipal Act represented an effort by the
provincial legislature to recognize that municipal government, especially
East York, supra note 49 at 797-98.
56 Ibid. at 797.
'See Smith v. London (1909), 20 O.L.R. 133 at 143 (Div. Ct.), where Riddell J. determines
that "[t]he municipality in Ontario is wholly a creature of the Legislature - it has no abstract rights
58 East York S.C.C., supra note 49.
59 R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26 [Alberta MunicipalAc4.
o Donald Lidstone, "A Comparison of New and Proposed Municipal Acts of the Provinces:
Revenues, Financial Powers and Resources" (Paper presented to the FCM Annual Meeting, Banff,
25 May 2001) [unpublished].
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in cities, had finally "grown up" (a metaphor endlessly repeated in these
debates), and was thus deserving of adult and perhaps even
governmental status. The new "purposes" section of the Alberta
Municipal Act is worth quoting, since similar clauses were inserted into
municipal acts in other provinces, with the exception of Ontario:
s. 3 The purposes of a municipality are:
(a) to provide good government;
(b) to provide services, facilities or other things, that in the opinion of the council, are
necessary or desirable for all or part of the municipality; and
(c) to develop safe and viable communities. 61
This apple-pie phrasing would not by itself grant municipalities
increased autonomy, of course, but the political discourse surrounding
the new act, in Alberta as elsewhere, indicates that the legislature
intended to grant municipalities more flexible and arguably more
powerful legal tools. As the Legislative Assembly Member introducing
the act commented, "Flexibility and innovation are key. Alberta
Municipal Affairs becomes a facilitator, not a regulator.,
62
In keeping with these winds of change, the Supreme Court of
Canada has gone on to undermine the old theory that municipalities are
mere creatures of the province. Most central has been the decision in
Spraytech v. Hudson,63 in which the Court allowed the town of Hudson,
Quebec, to ban the use of aesthetic pesticides, even if these were
considered non-toxic by provincial and federal regulators. Although
banning pesticide use altogether would be ultra vires,6 towns can
severely curtail their use even with little evidence of toxicity. Reliance
on the broad "precautionary principle" (invoked in such matters as the
regulation of nuclear power plants) to pass municipal bylaws restricting
the use of legal materials-in such a way as to cause serious economic
damage to a series of legal business operations-would, in the United
States, have invoked the police power of the state. And indeed, the
Court went on to conclude that Quebec law grants municipalities
Alberta MunicipalAct, supra note 59.
62 Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, No. 2 (9 May 1994) at 1775 (Mrs. Gordon).
6 114957 Canada Lt~e (Spraytech, Soci6t6 d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
241 [Spraytech]. See also the difference between the majority and dissenting opinions in Shell
Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (Cij), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231 [ShelA.
64 Spraytech, ibid. at 279.
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"general welfare" (salus populi) powers6-in other words, a police
power.
In stating that Quebec municipalities' power to protect the
general welfare indeed covers such actions as banning aesthetic
pesticide use, the Court relied on Ian M. Rogers' treatise,66 a key text in
Canadian municipal law, quoting that "the legislature cannot possibly
foresee all the powers that are necessary to the statutory equipment of
its creatures ... . Undoubtedly the inclusion of 'general welfare'
provisions was intended to circumvent, to some extent, the effect of the
doctrine of ultra vires .... ,,67 Further, the Court held that "[r]ecent
commentary suggests an emerging consensus that Courts must respect
the responsibility of elected municipal bodies to serve the people who
elected them and exercise caution to avoid substituting their views of
what is best for the citizens .... 68
If the Court had left the matter there, much of the impact of the
new doctrine would have been confined to judicial review of municipal
bylaws and policies, without necessarily affecting the political core of
provincial-municipal relations. However, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
added a comment destined to be quoted constantly by advocates of
municipal autonomy. Rather than the police power legacy, she invoked
the European Union's principle of "subsidiarity."69 This principle, which
European Union sources stress is not a justiciable legal doctrine but
rather a political principle,70 is invoked to elaborate the basic political
character of municipalities, with the Court addressing something much
larger than the traditional questions of ultra vires- and the standard of
review: "[L]awmaking and implementation are often best achieved at a
level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the
citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local
6 5 Ibid. at 258-60.
' Ian M. Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., looseleaf
(Toronto: Carswell, 1971).
6 Ibid. updated 2001, cumulative supp. to vol. 1 at 367; quoted in Spraytech, supra note 63
at 258-59.
Spraytech, supra note 63 at 262.
69 Ibid. at 249.
70 European Union, "Eu decision-making procedures: the subsidiarity principle and the
role of national parliaments," online: <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/subsidiarity
en.htm>.
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distinctiveness and population diversity."'" This sets the (supreme)
judicial cat among the provincial pigeons, since, read literally, it would
overturn the whole idea that municipalities are nothing but creatures of
the province.
The implications of this passage are uncertain. For one thing,
the doctrine of subsidiarity in Europe does not usually refer to
municipalities; it was devised to address national anxieties about the
creeping powers of a pan-European government.7 2 This calls into
question subsequent claims about the Canadian Supreme Court having
adopted the doctrine of subsidiarity to justify giving more powers to
municipalities.73 It is perhaps symptomatic of this ambiguity that the
City of Calgary, in its appeal to the Court of a case which we discuss in
Part III, section B, below, cannot even spell the European word
correctly:
In interpreting the scope of municipal powers, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in
114957 Canada Ltee. v. Town of Hudson (Hudson) that the Courts must adopt a
deferential approach to municipal governments and apply a liberal and benevolent
interpretation of their powers. The principle of subsidiary [sic] accepted by the Court
affirms that lawmaking and implementation are often best achieved at the local level
where municipal governments are closest to the citizens affected, most responsive to
their needs, to local distinctiveness and to population diversity. 4
The misspelling is no doubt due to automatic spell checkers, but
it illustrates the perils of importing a European Union legal-political
neologism without a proper discussion of how it is being used and its
relation to the basic architecture of the Constitution Act 1867 The
taking up of subsidiarity and of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's remarks
demonstrates the continued legal and political contestations over the
fundamental principles of Canadian municipal governance. The
question that remains, however, is whether this change in judicial
perspective will be sufficient to satisfy the present claims and needs of
7' Spraytech, supra note 63 at 249.
'European Union, supra note 70.
' The Canadian Institute of Planners' (2002) submission to the Sgro task force, for
example, lays out seven principles for federal participation in urban policy-making, including
"subsidiarity." See supra note 8 at 13.
7 United Taxi Drivers'Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City) (1998), 217 A.R. 1
(Q.B.) [United Taxi Q.B.], rev'd (2002), 303 A.R. 249 (C.A.) [United Taxi C.A.], rev'd [2004] 1
S.C.R. 485 [United TaxiS.C.C.]. See City of Calgary's application for leave to appeal to the S.C.C.,
online: localgovernment.ca <http://www.localgovernment.ca/show libary.cfm?id=76> at para. 25.
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Canadian cities. This leads us to consider how a key a provincial statute
within this recent spate of acts, the 1994 Alberta Municipal Government
Act, has been interpreted by the courts.
B. The Supreme Court Interprets the New MunicipalActs
The City of Calgary had been involved in disputes with a sector
of the taxi industry since before the passing of the 1994 Alberta
MunicipalAct. After its enactment, the protracted dispute took on new
life. Because of the act's broad "spheres of jurisdiction" approach, taxi
licensing is no longer specifically mentioned. This meant that the taxi
companies in question, which had long been trying to break the quasi
oligopoly created by the city's decision to freeze the number of taxi
plates and to make the scant number of existing plates available only to
established companies, now had to up the legal ante. They had to obtain
an authoritative ruling not only on the meaning and validity of the city's
system for taxi plates, but also on the interpretation of this new act.
In the 1998 Queen's Bench decision on this challenge,75 Justice
Rooke upheld the bylaw as intra vires, and questioned not only the
substance of the taxi companies' case but the quality of legal advice they
received. His decision, not surprisingly, was appealed.76 The appeal was
complicated because a new act had since been passed-and because the
taxi companies' legal counsel threw every possible argument at the
court, however dubious, including a challenge that "outsiders" (newer
taxi companies) were discriminated against contrary to section 15 of the
Charter.77
The Charter challenge was unsuccessful. Yet, to the surprise of
knowledgeable observers, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled in a 2-1
decision that the taxi plate bylaw was now ultra vires because no specific
mention of taxi plates, or any other specific business entity, existed in
the new act. Absent such specific mention, the majority argued, the city
could still develop a licensing system through its general business
licensing powers (section 8), but it could not create a quasi monopoly by
75 United Taxi Q.B., ibid.
76 United Taxi C.A., supra note 74.
'Ibid at 280-81; United Taxi S.C.C, supra note 74 at 496.
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freezing the number of plates since this essentially amounted to a
prohibition affecting everyone who was not already in the business.
The Court of Appeal judgment, which appears to be motivated
by a Dillon-like concern for the economic rights of business people, was
accompanied by a dissenting opinion by Justice O'Leary.7 9 Justice
O'Leary agreed with the trial judge that the non-enumerated regulatory
powers granted to municipalities by the 1994 Municipal Government
Act, under the "spheres of jurisdiction" approach, are broad enough to
accommodate not only the licensing of taxis but the specifics of the
bylaw regarding plates. Relying on the Supreme Court's evolving
jurisprudence on municipal powers in cases such as Spraytech,0 Justice
O'Leary placed the Calgary dispute firmly in the political context of the
"new deal for cities." He determined that the intent of the Alberta
legislature in passing the new Municipal Government Actwas not to put
an end to traditional regulatory practices (such as controlling the issuing
of taxi plates), but instead to enhance the ability of city councils to
respond to issues within their municipalities without being bound by the
prescribed powers doctrine.8' Justice O'Leary also noted that other
provinces had interpreted the Alberta act as granting municipalities
more powers, or at least more flexibility, to develop solutions to complex
problems within their jurisdiction.82 Though Justice O'Leary concluded
that the bylaw should be upheld, he indicated that the particular policy'
devised by the city-a lottery for taxi plates which could not be accessed
by new taxi owners-was problematic.
The Supreme Court of Canada, which decided the case twelve
years after it was launched, fully supported Justice O'Leary's
interpretation of the act.83 The Court's relatively brief judgment
extended beyond the act's business licensing powers (section 8), and
78 United Ta&'C.A., ibid. at 272-75.
79 Ibid. at 272-303.
8' This included Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, Shell, supra
note 63, as well as Spraytech, supra note 63.
Si United TaxiC.A., supra note 74 at 298.
82 Ibid. at 298-299.
At the Supreme Court, the city of Edmonton, the province of Alberta, and the province
of Nova Scotia intervened to support Calgary, arguing that a broad interpretation of the new
Municipal Government Act was essential for other Alberta municipalities and across the country.
Politically, this provincial support is particularly notable, reflecting a city-province alliance that
elsewhere seems highly elusive.
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provided a short but trenchant review of the act's interpretive
guidelines. These interpretive guidelines, at section 9 of the act, reflect
the political context of a "new deal for cities." The provision states, as
follows:
Under the heading "Guides to interpreting power to pass bylaws" we read:
9. The power to pass bylaws under this Division is stated in general terms to:
(a) give broad authority to councils and to respect their right to govern municipalities in
whatever way the councils consider appropriate, within the jurisdiction given to them
under this or any other enactment, and
(b) enhance the ability of councils to respond to present and future issues in their
municipalities.'
This statutory language allowed the Court to decide that "there is no
indication in the Act that the legislature intended to remove the
municipality's power to limit the number of taxi plate licences. To the
contrary, section 9(b) indicates that the legislature did not intend to
curtail the powers exercised by municipalities but rather sought to
enhance those powers "... ,85
The decision in United Taxi has proved important outside of the
Alberta context. In Croplife,86 the City of Toronto successfully defended
its new pesticide bylaw before the Ontario Court of Appeal. In deciding
the case, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the "broad and
purposive" approach developed in United Taxi as a new model for
interpreting municipal statutes, regardless of whether or not a
municipality is governed by an Alberta-like statute with flexible
powers.87
Taken together, this series of cases, including Spraytech, United
Tax4* and Croplife, indicates a change in judicial position that adds
important support to the political and legislative turn to a "new deal for
cities." Keeping this in mind, we now turn to Ontario, where the 2001
'4 Alberta MunicipalAct, supra note 59.
'- United Taxi S.C.C., supra note 74 at 494-495.
86 Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City) (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 521 (Sup. Ct.), aff d (2005), 75
O.R. (3d) 357 (C.A.) [Croplife C.A.], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 329
(QL).
8 An application for leave to appeal from this decision has since been dismissed, without
reasons, by the Supreme Court of Canada (ibid.).
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Municipal Act,8" which claims to be part of this new deal, appears in
some ways to be worse for municipalities than its predecessor.
IV. ONTARIO
A. The 2001 Ontario Municipal Act: Responsibility Without
Freedom of Choice
In this part, we provide a descriptive and broad-strokes analysis
of the basic logic of the Ontario Municipal Act-gleaned from the act
itself and from legislative debates and public hearings-and some of the
key differences between it and acts passed in other provinces.8 9
When the act was introduced (and indeed, when its predecessor,
drafted in 1998 but not passed, was introduced 9 ), two main innovations
were highlighted in the accompanying documents and speeches. One
was the replacement of Dillon's "prescribed powers" approach (often
called the "laundry list" approach) by "spheres of jurisdiction." As we
elaborate in this part, this was regarded as more rational and more
empowering for municipalities.
The second change was the introduction of a new clause giving
municipalities "natural person" powers. 9' This has not yet been judicially
interpreted and has not given rise to significant policy activity. But there
seems to be general agreement that natural person powers are not
meant to make municipalities exactly like private corporations (for
example, their annual budgets cannot show a deficit) but are intended to
facilitate private-public partnerships, such as business improvement
88S.O. 2001, c. 25 [Ontario MunicipalAct].
89 In our discussion, we focus on the field of licensing because this area has come to the
attention of the Supreme Court (in United Taxi), and also because one of the present authors is
undertaking an empirical study of business licensing in Toronto. A more exhaustive analysis of the
act would be premature: the Ontario MunicipalAct will soon be subject to a full five-year review,
probably by a (Liberal) government unsympathetic to the Tory government that passed the act. In
addition, the Act is currently being modified in non-public consultations with the Association of
Municipalities of Ontario on the one hand, and the City of Toronto on the other hand.
o Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "Proposed Legislation New
Municipal Act: Consultation Draft" in A Proposed New Municipal Act: Draft Legislation,
Including Explanatory Notes, Consultation Document (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario,
1998) ["Proposed Legislation"].
9 Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 8.
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areas.92 Yet even these natural person powers are eroded by highly
detailed restrictions micromanaging the municipal procurement process.
This erosion has led the Association of Municipal Managers, Clerks and
Treasurers of Ontario (AMCTO) to question with some dismay: "If
municipalities have 'natural person powers,' why should the proposed
legislation prescribe the contents of municipal procurement policies in
such detail? In fact, why should it even be necessary to prescribe that
municipalities adopt a procurement policy?"93
The precise extent of these natural person powers is best left to
municipal financing experts. Instead, we will analyze a few aspects of the
new act, beginning with the "purposes"-or lack of them-ascribed to
municipalities. There, much turns on the invocation of terms such as
"accountability and responsibility,"94  through which a series of
financially and administratively burdensome requirements are imposed,
and which are likely to be experienced as continued provincial
paternalism. We then briefly turn to two additional parts of the act: the
"spheres of jurisdiction" approach mentioned above and the act's
business licensing provisions.
1. Municipalities are created...
When articulating the purposes of municipalities, the Alberta
Municipal Act begins by outlining that these are "(a) to provide good
government; (b) to provide services, facilities or other things that, in the
opinion of the council, are necessary or desirable for all or part of the
92 Business improvement areas presently exist as ad hoc legal entities. On municipal
budgets and deficits, see ibid., s. 289.
' Association of Municipal Managers, Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario, "The AMCTO's
Response to Bill 111, 'The MunicipalAct, 2001"' (Paper presented to the Standing Committee on
General Government, 21 November 2001), online: <http://www.amcto.com/db/
newsinfo.asp?itemtype=728&it=728&itemid= 4226> at 3. This twenty-page analysis of the act,
submitted to the provincial government, shows that before these restrictive regulations were issued,
the provincial government was already taking away with a less visible hand what they had given
publicly by the other hand.
I Pat O'Malley, "Risk and Responsibility" in Andrew. Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas
S. Rose, eds., Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of
Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 189 [O'Malley, "Risk and
Responsibility"]; Pat O'Malley, Risk, Uncertainty, and Government (London:
Cavendish/Glasshouse, 2004); and Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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municipality; and (c) to develop and maintain safe and viable
communities."95
In Ontario, by contrast, council's opinion about the community's
needs is not mentioned. Citizenship as a practice of freedom does not
exist, even in a form like the mild Alberta wording of developing "safe
and viable communities." In keeping with the logic of holding political
and legal institutions responsible,96 the Ontario Municipal Act instead
presents the "purposes" of municipalities merely as being to serve as
repositories of responsibilities:
Municipalities are created by the Province of Ontario to be responsible and accountable
governments with respect to matters within their jurisdiction and each municipality is
given powers and duties under this Act and many other Acts for purposes which include:
(a) providing the services and other things that the municipality considers are necessary
or desirable for the municipality;
(b) managing and preserving the public assets of the municipality;
(c) fostering the current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of the
municipality; and
(d) delivering and participating in provincial programs and initiatives.97
Particularly when compared with other provinces, the Ontario
act is unusual because it begins by reiterating the old Dillon fear of cities
spending property taxpayers' money on infrastructure and other projects
(subsection (b)).98 But most striking is the first sentence. Instead of
recognizing that citizens and communities over time develop a desire for
self-governance-in keeping with the somewhat mythical but powerful
narrative about cities as the site of civic education, virtue, and
freedom-section 2 informs Ontarians that the province has created
municipalities, like God creating light, and that these entities are
created to be "responsible and accountable."
9 Alberta MunicipalAct supra note 59, s. 3.
' "Responsibilization" and accountability are two great bywords of neo-liberal politics: see
O'Malley, "Risk and Responsibility," supra note 94; and Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom:
Refraining Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9 Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 2.
1 This is all the more surprising given the restrictions on borrowing and taxing within
municipal acts generally.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44, NO. 3
2. "Responsibilization" and Accountability
Under these rubrics of accountability and transparency, the
Ontario Municipal Act imposes on municipalities an onerous series of
new procedural requirements.99 These include detailed public notice
requirements regarding municipal budgets, thereby highlighting the
province's Dillon-like fears of municipal wastefulness:
Section 291 of the new Act requires that the City give public notice of its intention to
adopt or amend a budget at a council meeting specified in the notice. The new Act does
not provide a definition of budget amendment, for purposes of section 291 ... . The
intent of section 291 is to provide for accountable and transparent decision-making
regarding municipal budgets-and likely speaks to the legislative practices of other
Ontario municipalities, which do not have the open government traditions of the City of
Toronto. If even the minimum notice requirements of the recommended bylaw were
applied to every budget amendment, the result would be a virtually impossible standard
for Council to meet and would result in unnecessary, ineffective, and expensive notice for
routine items regarding budget adjustments by Council and staff.'O°
Budgetary matters are not the only ones with new process
requirements. One seemingly small requirement that appears to flow
from this "responsible and accountable" language is that the city must
now provide details of how business licence fees are calculated for each
type of business."' To compound municipal difficulties, section 150
states: "The total amount of fees to be charged for licensing a class of
business shall not exceed the costs directly related to the administration
and enforcement of the by-law or portion of the by-law. 102
The two sections set up a standard that may be impossible to
meet. Provincial cabinet ministers probably do not know that most cities
On the financial and non-financial dimensions of this quest for accountability, see Power,
supra note 94.
1o Chief Administrative Officer, City of Toronto, "Municipal Act, 2001 Implementation"
(Staff Report to Policy and Finance Committee, 23 October 2002) at 4, 5, online:
< http:/www.city.toronto.on.calegdocs/2002/agendas/committees/hl/h1021118/it005.pdf>.
101 Ontario Municipal Act, supra note 88, s. 158. The Ontario Chamber of Commerce,
appearing at the hearings on Bill 111, expressed fears that "the new legislation would give
municipalities greater access to user and licensing fees," while the Toronto Board of Trade
expressed similar fears but acknowledged that the government had responded to business concerns
in the final version of the act: "[W]e support the guarantee under the legislation that licensing fees
would not be permitted to exceed the costs of administration and enforcement ..." (supra note 29).
On their part, representatives from the hotel and trucking industries expressed gratefulness to the
Conservative government for their continued exemption from municipal licensing (ibid.).
.Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 150(9).
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work mainly with "generalist" licensing and standards officers. The
activities of these officers are complaint driven and rarely engage in
proactive inspections. As a result, any figures that are attached to
particular types of business licence are a form of guesswork, which may
aggravate municipal frustrations.
In addition, the Ontario Municipal Act departs from the
standard doctrine that acknowledges the ability of municipal councils
and other municipally based bodies to charge licence fees as a form of
tax, for revenue purposes, without having to limit the fee to enforcement
costs. 3 The Alberta Municipal Act, for example, allows licensing fees
on certain businesses as "a reasonable tax for the activity authorized or
for the purpose of raising revenue."'' Even the overturned judgment of
the Alberta Court of Appeal in United Taxi, which took a narrow view
of municipal powers, remarks that alongside municipal powers to target
disorder, "sometimes termed 'the police power' because it enables local
authorities to regulate and control trades and businesses," there exists a
licensing power that is merely a form of "revenue raising."'10 5
The examples listed here-public notice provisions, new rules
restricting small financial decisions, delays caused by the need to comply
with consultation requirements, and new rules governing business
licensing fees-are but a few areas of municipal governance likely to be
hampered by the new Ontario MunicipalAct. Simply put, the act creates
responsibilities without providing the resources or the powers to manage
them, and then compounds this by continuing to micromanage process
as well as content.
3. Spheres of jurisdiction and prescribed powers
The 1998 draft legislation of a new version of the Ontario
Municipal Act set out thirteen "spheres of jurisdiction" for municipal
powers." 6 This meant that a large number of sections and regulations
o Subsection 92(9) of the Constitution Act 1867 allows provinces to make laws about
"shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer and other licences in order to raise revenue for provincial, local,
or municipal purposes" (supra note 26). These powers had been exercised by municipalities in the
years before the Constitution Act 1867, and continued to be exercised, now as delegated by
provincial governments, afterwards.
"4Alberta MunicipalAct, supra note 59, s. 8(c)(i).
'0' United Taxi C.A., supra note 74 at 267-268.
""Proposed Legislation;" supra note 88, s. 11(1).
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from the previous act' were no longer required because they were now
covered by more general "spheres."
But the province did not intend to cede its power to prohibit
municipalities from undertaking new regulatory initiatives. As a result,
while the act gave municipalities broader "spheres of jurisdiction," the
province wrote a series of restrictions and exceptions into the act."08 A
provincial document issued to explain how the draft 1998 legislation was
amended before its passage in 2001 is unwittingly revealing: "By
removing a few key 'spheres' where the potential for overlap with
provincial jurisdiction is greatest, the need to impose restrictions and
limits is greatly reduced."'' 9 The spheres of jurisdiction that were
eliminated in this way were health, safety, and the protection and well-
being of people; nuisances; and the natural environment.
It should be noted at the outset that health, safety, and "salus
populi' were not eliminated altogether; they remain in the Municipal
Act, but no longer as a sphere of jurisdiction. One vestige of "health,
safety and well-being" is found in one of the three rationales or rubrics
under which municipalities are allowed to levy business licence fees. "'
The concept makes a second appearance at section 130, which confers
residual powers to make bylaws promoting the "health, safety and well-
being" of citizens. Just what this might cover is disputable, since the
highly prescriptive nature of the rest of the act does not support a broad
interpretation of section 130 as restoring the salus populi jurisdiction.
For example, the section that immediately follows is "Wrecking and
salvaging of automobiles," 1 and other sections allow municipalities to
1
0 7 Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M-45, as repealed by.Ontario Municipal Act, supra note
88, s. 484.
" In the context of Toronto, this was heightened by a more historically specific small-town
Tory dislike for the City of Toronto council and its bureaucracy.
" Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, New Directions. A New Municipal
Act for Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2001) at 6. This document candidly admits
that the province decided to hear business interests rather than municipal voices in its revision of
the 1998 draft legislation, stating that the limits on municipal powers were denounced by
municipalities, but "on the other hand, provincial ministries and business groups felt that these
limits were necessary" (ibid. at 8) [emphasis added].
"'uOntario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 150(1).
.". Ibid., s. 131.
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undertake such specific safety measures as compelling residents to clear
snow and ice from the abutting sidewalk.'
12
Yet section 130 has been judicially interpreted broadly, as
exemplified by the decision in Croplife. Pursuant to section 130, and
motivated by Spraytech, the City of Toronto passed a bylaw, which is
very much like the one in Hudson, restricting the use of pesticides for
aesthetic purposes. This was challenged by gardening and pesticide
companies.
The city's case was weakened because the introductory section
of the Toronto bylaw makes reference to "environmental protection"-
a sphere which had been removed from the provincial bill before it
became law in 2001. But on the motion challenging the bylaw, Justice
Somers concluded that the main purpose of the bylaw was not to
regulate the environment (thereby declaring irrelevant the voluminous
conflicting expert evidence about whether pesticides in use in gardens
and golf courses are toxic). Despite the legally incautious inclusion of
the word "environmental," Justice Somers found that the bylaw's
purpose is to promote the health, safety, and well-being of
Torontonians. As an environmental bylaw, it would have been ultra vires
the city, but a reliance on more general, non-scientific notions of
"health, safety and well-being" that have for centuries been used to
allow cities to govern all kinds of moral and physical dangers and risks,
was sufficient to render the pesticide bylaw intra vires.
In dismissing an appeal from the Croplife decision, the Ontario
Court of Appeal emphasized the Supreme Court's elaboration, over the
1990s, of a "broad and purposive" approach to municipal powers.
Maintaining the motion judge's decision that the bylaw emphasizes
"health, safety and well-being," the court further agreed that section 130
was not to be read narrowly. In so doing, the Court of Appeal
determined that support from the legislative history for a narrow
reading of section 130 was itself equivocal, so that the mere fact that
section 130 identifies a specific power in the act-there being no express
legislative direction to interpret it narrowly-"does not exempt it from
the modern interpretive rules."'1 13 Six months later, an application for
leave to appeal was dismissed, without reasons, by the Supreme Court.
1
2 Ibid, S. 122.
113 Croplife C.A., supra note 86.
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a. The public welfare and business licensing
The civic poverty of the Ontario act could not be more strikingly
demonstrated than in the text of the "purposes" section of the general
licensing section, which states that municipalities can "only" license and
regulate businesses under three headings: "1. Health and safety"; "2.
Nuisance control"; and "3. Consumer protection... 4 This is indeed a
case of "cities without citizens.""' Citizens no longer exist, nor do
communities: there are only property owners, ratepayers, and, fleetingly,
the public, which is transformed by this legislation into a more
specifically neo-liberal identity of consumers. " 6
We now turn to a point about business licensing, namely the
persistence of Dillon fears about cities putting their hands into the
pockets of businesses. While the regulation of businesses for the
protection of consumers is said to be the key goal and the justification of
licensing schemes, municipalities remain deprived of a common
regulatory tool: fines. Provincial and federal regulatory agencies can use
the threat of fines to achieve compliance, yet municipalities can only
impose fines in certain areas (most notably parking). Businesses such as
restaurants or pawn shops that are found to breach the conditions of
their licences can only have them revoked altogether, and that decision
can be appealed to the Licensing Tribunal. In contrast to Canadian
courts' increased willingness to expand the scope of municipal authority,
the limited legislative availability of intermediate sanctions is a glaring
limit on cities' ability to carry out regulatory functions and to produce
the kind of orderly civic space that citizens want and expect.
... Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 150(2).
"i Engin F. Isin, Cities Without Citizens Modernity of the City as a Corporation
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992).
n6 Municipal law practitioners point out that the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996 S.O.
1996, c. 1, which received little public airing (and was never cited in the "new deal for cities"
political documents), gave municipalities greater licensing powers by removing the laundry list of
businesses subject to licensing in favour of a general provision. See e.g. Theresa Leitch, "Licensing
Powers Under the Ontario Municipal Acts" The Lawyers Edge (20 March 2003) Tab 5, online: The
Lawyers Edge <http://www.softconference.com/oba/publication.aspx?userlD=70554751306389461
17200684447&code=03MUN0320C>. This was then curtailed in 2001 through the "consumer
protection" et cetera clauses. It is unclear why this happened; however, given the tenor of business
comments on the Ontario Municipal Act, one suspects that businesses applied pressure on the
Conservative government.
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b. The public welfare and nuisances
Before the introduction of zoning law and environmental
regulations, nuisances constituted the bread and butter of municipal
regulation." 7 And most recently, in a nuisance case out of Montreal, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the city's power to regulate noise
through municipal bylaw.'18 Whereas the Quebec Court of Appeal had
developed a narrower framework for determining the scope of
municipal powers to regulate nuisances,1 9 a majority of the Supreme
Court found that this did not "show the City the deference it is owed
with respect to the exercise of its powers." 2° The Court took a broad
view, which noted, for instance, that "noise affects city dwellers in their
everyday lives and was one of the earliest concerns of municipal
governments," and that "the City has had the authority to regulate
nuisances since before Confederation."'' In so doing, the Court
determined that even though the City of Montreal's noise bylaw
infringed on section 2(b), the right to free expression in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,122 it was a reasonable limit on this right-justified,
in large part, by the city's goal of producing a healthy and peaceful
urban environment.
While this decision supports a broad reading of the nuisance
sections of the Ontario Municipal Act, note a curious contradiction in
the Ontario legislation. Subsection 128(1) reads: "A local municipality
may prohibit and regulate with respect to public nuisances, including
matters that, in the opinion of the council, are or could become or cause
public nuisances." The overinclusive language of the section would
suggest that any routine urban activity could become or cause a public
nuisance, if carried out in the wrong time or in the wrong manner. The
scope of section 128(1) is accompanied by a privative clause, which
1 Beth Bilson, The Canadian Law of Nuisance (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991); Novak,
supra note 39.
"sMontreal (Ville) v. 2952-1366 Oudbec inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 [Montrea4.
"
9 Montreal( Ville) c. 2952-1366 Ouebec inc., [2002] R.J.Q. 2986 (C.A.).
'
20 Montrdal, supra note 118 at 161.
' Ibid. at 154.
122 Charter, supra note 51.
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states that "[t]he opinion of the council under this section, if arrived at
in good faith, is not subject to review by any court.' 12 3
The broad and unreviewable powers granted by section 128 are
somewhat undermined, however, by the highly prescriptive tone and
content of section 129. One example will give the flavour of its
prescriptiveness: "A by-law under subsection (1) [of section 129] shall
not require light fixtures used in conjunction with commercial,
industrial, institutional, agricultural or recreational uses to be turned off
at any time the use is actually being conducted."' " Two other
subsections limiting municipalities' powers to regulate outdoor
illumination follow in paragraphs (b) and (c). Perhaps commercial
illumination requires specific mention because it is not a traditional
target of nuisance powers, but noise, odour, and dust are well within,
and indeed at the core of, the common law of public nuisance. 25
Mentioning them specifically in section 129(1) only undermines the
"spheres of jurisdiction" approach.
To complicate this further, as mentioned above, the general
licensing section also mentions "nuisance control."' 126 This time,
however, nuisance control is not a separate bylaw-making power, but
one of three rationales under which licensing powers can be exercised.
The relation between the different occurrences of nuisance is murky.
How a municipality is supposed to determine which nuisances are to be
preventively governed by means of licensing and inspections, and which
are to be regulated or prohibited by other means (for example, by a
specific bylaw declaring something to be a nuisance or to be at risk of
becoming a nuisance, as per section 128), is not obvious. And
interpreting or using either of these sections to pass new bylaws is
further complicated by specific bylaws, which regulate some of what has
traditionally been covered by the public nuisance category. The noise
bylaw, for example, is used by police and bylaw enforcement officers on
a routine basis, and is also used to govern disorder proactively by way of
prevention. Yet how it relates to any occurrence of "public nuisance" in
the 2001 act is unclear.
" Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 128(1), (2).
124 Ibid., s. 129(2).
'l' Bilson, supra note 117.
126 Ontario MunicipalAct, supra note 88, s. 150(2).
[VOL. 44, NO. 3
Freedom of the City
The general point is that the 2001 Ontario Municipal Act does
not effect a shift away from a laundry list of prescribed powers toward a
more empowering spheres of jurisdiction approach. Instead, the act
presents a confusing mix of legal logics, with some powers which are
granted in a general form coexisting with other powers (even over the
same regulatory targets) which take a micromanagerial-specified form.
At the time of this writing, the Toronto pesticide bylaw challenge is the
only reported case in which courts have interpreted the relation between
those sections written in the "police powers-like" language of generality
and unreviewability, and those written in the traditional laundry list of
prescribed powers manner. The indication is that perhaps despite the
increased judicial willingness to interpret municipal authority broadly,
Ontario cities may have gained little by way of new powers or by way of
greater flexibility in exercising old powers through their legislation.
Even for areas in which a reading of the act suggests that greater
or more flexible powers have been granted,. these are sometimes
undermined by the regulations. For instance, a Toronto proposal to use
the more flexible powers of the new act to require large apartment
buildings to obtain an operating licence (with a basic audit as a
prerequisite), despite meeting all of the act's requirements, will first
require the agreement of the province to repeal a particular
regulation. 27 It is most remarkable that a senior provincial Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing official, interviewed by us in 2004,
opined that this apartment licensing bylaw seemed eminently sensible
because it fell squarely within the "consumer protection" subsection of
the licensing section. The official did not know that the proposal could
not proceed unless theprovincial government struck out a regulation.
V. CASE STUDY 1: THE LIMITS OF CITIES' FREEDOM TO
ADDRESS THE HOUSING CRISIS
It is widely acknowledged that a specific problem faced by cities,
and not by most other municipalities, is the crisis created by rising house
prices, higher rents, and a marked slowdown (or even a halt) to the
'O.Reg. 243/02. See also the discussion in Commissioner, Urban Development Services,
"A Framework Strategy to Ensure that Privately-owned, Multi-Unit Residential Buildings are
maintained in accordance with the Provisions of the Toronto Municipal Code" (Staff Report to the
Planning and Transportation Committee, 10 December 2003).
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provision of affordable housing and public housing. The sudden and
rapid increase in the visibility of homelessness over the 1990s, especially
in Vancouver and Toronto, is the visible tip of a larger iceberg-an
iceberg that includes overcrowded and substandard housing (municipal
policies having failed to enforce building codes and rental housing rules
for fear of causing more homelessness), pressures on municipal budgets
caused by the provision of (expensive) family shelters or municipally
financed motels, and women and children living with abusive men
because of a lack of alternatives."l 8 Although federal and provincial
governments have helped to create this urban housing crisis, it is largely
the cities that are left to solve the problem.
In addressing the larger systemic problem that gives rise to
homelessness and other less visible crises, cities are limited not only by
finances but also by inadequate legal tools. The need for the province to
amend the regulations associated with the 2001 Municipal Act before
Toronto can develop an apartment building licensing scheme, reflects
the paternalism in city-province relations: a recent initiative to address
homelessness-the 2003 municipal shelter bylaw129 -is a case in point,
which reveals that some of the difficulties and disutilities are created by
the lack of appropriate legal tools.
After no less than seven staff reports on how the
recommendations of the Toronto Mayor's Homelessness Action Task
Force131 might be carried out, Toronto city council considered several
options to facilitate new emergency shelters. Chief among these was a
zoning bylaw amendment, which was necessitated by the existing bylaw
that hampered efforts to create new shelters.
After several years of often heated debate-many councillors
wanted a higher number of restrictions on the provision of shelter beds,
in their own wards at any rate-council passed a uniform city-wide
zoning bylaw in 2003, which outlines a consistent set of zoning
permissions. These permissions were not for shelters in general, but for
128 An important document was Toronto (Ont.), Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force,
Taking responsibility for homelessness an action plan for Toronto: Report of the Mayor's
Homelessness Action Task Force (Toronto: The Task Force, 1999) [Taking ResponsibiliA. In
addition to a large scholarly literature documenting the housing crisis, in Toronto the United Way
has undertaken important research on increased levels of urban poverty.
129 City of Toronto, By-law No. 138-2003, Municipal Shelter By-Law(l1 February 2003).
o Taking Responsibility, supra note 128.
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a much narrower category of municipally run emergency shelters for
homeless persons. In itself, this was an achievement. The mechanisms of
zoning law make it difficult for Canadian municipalities to promote
anything like the "inclusionary zoning" policies currently in force in a
variety of jurisdictions, particularly in the United States.131 Apart from
the middle class backlash against "undesirables," there are specific,
provincially created obstacles to inclusionary zoning. For instance, in
keeping with the "responsibilization" and transparency logics discussed
in Part IV, above, provincial law requires cities contemplating zoning
changes to hold public meetings and consultations in often complicated
and expensive ways. This obligation gives a platform to those who
oppose inclusionary measures; they are generally more educated and
better equipped to participate in meetings, petitions, and phone calls to
councillors than those who are the potential beneficiaries of inclusionary
zoning measures. In Toronto, predictably, most of the "untold number
of community meetings"'32 around the new bylaw degenerated into
angry shouting matches dominated by NIMBY-Style middle class
homeowners panicking about the possibility of homeless shelters near
their properties. 33 Given the proliferation of these provincially
mandated platforms, where worried middle class homeowners pressure
their local councillors, it is remarkable that city council was able to pass
the compromise bylaw of 2003.134
131 A useful source on inclusionary zoning policies and bylaws throughout the United States
is the "NIMBY report" originally produced by the American Friends Service Committee and now by
the National Low Income Housing Coalition. See The NIMBY Report. On the Continuing Struggle
for Inclusive Communities, online: <http://www.nlihc.org/nimby/index.htm>. The Toronto process
summarized here has many parallels in American municipalities.
132 Toronto (City) Zoning By-law No. 138-2003 (Re) [2004] O.M.B.D. No. 280 (QL) at
para. 29 [Zoning By-lag].
' This summary is based on a study of city council minutes, the extensive coverage given
by the Toronto Star, and the reports produced by city staff. The authors thank to Prashan
Ranansinghe for his thorough research on the background to the bylaw and his summaries of
relevant articles, minutes, and documents. See e.g. Zoning By-law, ibid. at 10-11; Terry Gillespie,
"Both sides oppose shelter bylaw; Too restrictive, tenant group says But ratepayers want more
limits" Toronto Star (14 October 2003) Bi; Kerry Gillespie, Bruce Demara & Paul Moloney,
"Shelter bylaw forums raise a tempest; "Residents fear homeless influx into neighbourhoods"
Toronto Star (18 September 2002) B1; and Jack Lakey, "Shelter bylaw raises strong reaction"
Toronto Star (15 April 2002) B5.
134 Going against the grain of zoning law, the 2001 proposed bylaw would have abolished
separation requirements and limits on the sort of street on which city shelters could be placed.
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The main effect of this bylaw is that it applied to the whole city,
which made it possible to distribute homeless shelters more widely. The
shelters, however, were by no means allowed to mushroom. The struggle
around the bylaw was, in broad terms, a struggle between the logic of
zoning law-which has always been a logic of differentiation, class
separation, and exclusive enclave creation-and the logic of social
welfare, which is inclusive and rights oriented. The 2003 bylaw, which is
similar to many other city measures, created a pragmatic compromise
between the exclusionary, property-driven logic of zoning/planning'35
and a social-welfarist logic. Thus, while shelters could be located
anywhere in the city, their provision would be strictly limited because
the new bylaw, in contrast to the inclusionary 2001 proposed bylaw, set a
separation of 250 metres between municipal shelters. 136 It also limited
shelters to locations along an "arterial road or minor arterial road."' 37
The ratepayers' associations would challenge this bylaw and take
the city to the OMB. Given that other zoning bylaws were inconsistent
across the post-amalgamation megacity, the new bylaw governing
municipal shelters was seen as a pilot project to impose the more
"progressive" standards for regulating housing which had been current
in the old city of Toronto on the whole, merged city. 138 Thus, ratepayers'
associations who worried about institutional uses other than shelters-
especially associations located in what had been independent suburbs,
Scarborough in particular-had grounds to see the shelter bylaw as a
dangerous precedent. But perhaps less predictably, the compromise
bylaw was challenged from the opposite side of the political fence, by
the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO). 139 This poor people's
" Apart from the legal literature on zoning and planning, historical and socio-legal studies
demonstrate how zoning law allows and encourages segregation on the basis of class, race, and
family structure. See Don Mitchell, The Right to the City Social Justice and the Fight for Public
Space (New York: Guilford Press, 2003).
136Of course, zoning variances and recognitions of legal non-conforming uses are regularly
granted, especially to established social service providers in the downtown core, because this is
where residents are habituated to such types of housing and less likely to complain even at the more
accessible Committee of Adjustment, never mind the more legalistic OMB. It is not the case that
most shelters and similar institutional uses in Toronto are 250 metres apart from each other.
'
3 7 Supra note 129, s. 2(ii).
L Many of the city council debates about the zoning bylaw for shelters included discussions
of policies around "second suites," and city staff reports on the shelter bylaw question often
included recommendations about standardizing the rooming-house licensing bylaw.
'
39 Zoning By-law, supra note 132.
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advocacy group argued that the 250-metre rule and the restriction of
shelters to arterial roads greatly limited the city's ability to provide
shelter at low cost and encouraged the continuing use of large
institutional buildings which the target population disliked. The group
also tried to mount a Charter challenge by claiming that the homeless
constitute a discrete group analogous to those named in section 15 of
the Charter, a claim that, if successful, would have resulted in the
invalidation of zoning bylaws which distinguish homeless shelters from
other types of group housing.14°
In other provinces such a bylaw could have been contested in
court, but in Ontario, zoning disputes are appealed to the OMB. The
formally democratic process governing new zoning bylaws and bylaw
amendments, itself imposed on municipalities by provincial legislation
(public meetings, delays, notice to neighbours, et cetera), is thus always
subject to being trumped by a provincial body, and an appointed one at
that.
The Confederation of Residents and Ratepayers' Associations
withdrew from the lawsuit due to lack of funding, but the OMB panel
that heard the challenge considered the ratepayers' initial written
submissions. The OMB decision 4 . describes in some detail the lengthy
consultation process undertaken by the city and the protracted debates
within city council committees and at council itself. The OMB concludes
that the bylaw was not perfect, but was a reasonable compromise, and
had been subject to a lengthy consultation process which gave it
legitimacy. The Board found the bylaw on the whole valid while also
expanding its scope by stating that municipal shelters could be placed
not only on arterial roads but also in bits of residential streets near
arterial roads ("arterial road corridors"). 42
" In the United States there have been similar efforts to use rights statutes to trump
exclusionary zoning measures, thus using the existence of contradictory logics in different areas of
law to pursue progressive policy goals. However, a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
finding that the Fair Housing Act does not apply to and hence does not invalidate municipal
NIMBY-style referendums garnering public (white) support for excluding land uses associated with
blacks and poor people (public housing, mainly) does not bode well for such campaigns to play
existing law against itself. See Cuyahoga Falls (City of), Ohio et al. v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
"4 Zoning By-la w, supra note 132.
142 Ibid. at paras. 181-85.
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On the conflict between the inclusionary logic of social welfare
and the openly exclusionary, discriminatory logic of zoning, the OMB
expressed its dismay at the tenants' group's attempt to use the Board to
bring about a major change in constitutional law (that is, the recognition
of homeless people as a group deserving of section 15 protection).
While chastising the ACTO in unusually strong terms, it is curious that
the OMB proceeded to opine on the constitutional matter, stating that if
it had had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional case (which it more or
less heard, however unwillingly), it would have concluded that the
zoning bylaw did not breach section 15 of the Charter.43 The Board
panel bristled at the suggestion-apparently made by ACTO-that both
the bylaw and the OMB discriminated against a vulnerable discrete
minority, namely the homeless. In response, the OMB stated that "the
Board does not make decisions based on any assessment of the
character or type of people who will access the use."'" Equally reflected
in earlier case law,'45 the central fiction of zoning law is that one can
govern "uses" without having an impact on social relations between
identifiable groups of people. As the OMB said:
There is no distinction based on personal characteristics of a group or individual, nor any
distinction of any kind apparent, implied, or as a result of this by-law. Any person may
access the facilities if they find themselves homeless and there is capacity at the
shelter.46
With regard to the metaphysical question of whether shelters are
or are not housing, despite the obvious fact that people use them as
housing, the' OMB's finding is consistent with its views about the
homeless. If anyone can become homeless, it follows that .shelters are
not "housing," as this would imply a somewhat long-term use of the
building by a distinct population. The OMB thereby insisted that shelters
are "facilities," and not "housing.' 147
One could say more about the OMB's forays into constitutional
law and social policy. For instance, our interviews indicate that perhaps
"' Ibid. at para. 20; see also paras. 168-197.
4 Ibid. at para. 34.
'See e.g. Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba v. Winnipeg (City ot) (1990), 69 D.L.R.
(4th) 697 (Man. C.A.).
46 Zoning By-law, supra note 132 at para. 148.
14 Ibid. at paras. 60-66.
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in contrast to the OMB's often pro-developer stance,148 in the area of
supportive housing the OMB is regarded as a key actor that can promote
the city's social policies.'49 But for our purposes, the OMB decision
demonstrates some of the problems arising from cities' lack of legal
tools to address current social challenges. Zoning bylaws and zoning
variances-long important tools of municipalities across North
America-are not suited to policy goals arising out of social and
political problems such as severe poverty and homelessness. If
municipalities, and especially large cities with visible concentrations of
poverty, continue to be responsible for problems originating in the
fraying of Canada's social safety net, they need to be provided with legal
tools suited to their social goals.
VI. CASE STUDY 2
A. The Ouest for a City Charter Acquiring the Tools of Global
Cities
What if we took onto the international stage? Wouldn't it be wonderful if our next
meeting was in London, England, because it has a city charter? Imagine the international
press! Unable to get the attention of our provinces, unable to get the attention of our
Canadian government, we have gone to London, England to discuss and find out how
that city charter works.
50
Such comments highlight the heated debates over municipal
autonomy that gained attention over the last decade. At their core is an
argument that, to compete internationally, Canada's largest cities
(especially Toronto) cannot be governed through standard municipal
acts that treat all cities the same way. Instead, Toronto requires a
"charter" to provide it with wide-ranging powers to raise revenue and
govern its own affairs independent of provincial control and
permissions.
While the idea of a charter remains vague and largely
undefined-and as a legal matter, a charter provides no greater
148 John G. Chipman, A Law Unto Itself How the Ontario Municipal Board Has
Developed and Applied Land Use Planning Policy(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
" This is borne out by interviews with supportive housing providers, conducted in 2005 by
Mariana Valverde, in which the respondents were promised confidentiality.
I5 "C5: Historic first meeting of Canadian mayors with Jane Jacobs" (2001) 2:1 Ideas That
Matter 3 at 20-21 (quoting Dale Stanway, CEO of the City of Calgary).
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autonomy than would a more generous municipal act-the city charter
debate is rife with symbolic politics over the need for Toronto to be
competitive in a global economy, and for regulators to recognize the
new historical context in which Canada's largest cities operate. 5' The
context in which the above statement was made provides some insight
into what is being sought, namely, urban advocates Jane Jacobs.and
Alan Broadbent, and the mayors of Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto,
Montreal, and Winnipeg, presenting their views on the needs *of
Canadian cities. Perhaps not surprisingly, four of these mayors focused
on their respective cities' economic needs, from the need for increased
revenue to the need to improve public transit, sewer systems, crime
control, poverty, air pollution, and so on. Speaking on behalf of the City
of Toronto, however, Mayor Mel Lastman made it clear that while
money was key, a core problem was in Toronto's lack of legal tools: "We
can't make a move without the provincial government saying, yes, it's
okay. ," 1
52
This concern about the dependency. of cities on provincial
governments, and the need for new legal tools for Canadian cities to
succeed, is premised on a set of claims about cities that are invoked
throughout the political debates over municipal autonomy. While we
return to these in more detail in Part VI, section B, below, here we
highlight the basic structure that these claims take through the
comments of Jane Jacobs at this 2001 meeting of mayors. What we
distill from her comments are four interconnected logics that broadly
echo those on which the city charter movement rests its claims.
First, the legal governance of Canadian cities keeps them
infantilized. Cities must "grow up" and no longer resort to begging from
the provincial and federal governments. "Too many Canadian cities,"
Jacobs suggests, "remain forever in adolescence"; even for those cities
that have "grown up," she claims that
[t]he reliance on provincial grants and federal largesse is very crippling. It demeans city
governments, putting them in the demoralizing position of being considered incompetent
to manage their own internal affairs. It makes beggars out of them as they have to plead
and wheedle to get some of the money ... Y3
"' But see Andrew, supra note 47 at 147-48.
' Supra note 150 at 10.
15-1 Ibid. at 6.
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Second, dependency is not merely a problem of resources.
Instead, dependency is normatively unsatisfactory for cities regardless of
the financial consequences. As Jacobs illustrates, "dependency is not to
be cultivated":
[I]t is debilitating, demoralizing, wasteful, and not a good condition in general, whether it
applies to people or to institutions. If dependency is bad for everything else, why the
notion that it's good for cities? It isn't. It absolutely isn't. You can see how it infantilizes
cities, making them childish in many ways, to the disgust of their own citizens.'54
Third, the model governing Canadian cities does not recognize
cities' new challenges and functions. Jacobs argues that
[a]s wards of the province, cities were allowed only to levy property taxes. This was not a
bad idea when their capabilities in most cases were limited to maintaining roads, fighting
fires, providing water and sewers, keeping drunks in hand and, in general, directly
servicing properties. Times have changed beyond recognition. Canadian municipalities
are no longer country bumpkin villages - they have wide ranges of abilities and human
capital. Yet the old arrangements have remained .... "'
Fourth, Canadian cities are improperly governed through "one
size fits all" models, which ignores their diverse roles and needs. For
Jacobs, this is closely tied in with the other three logics:
[Provincial and federal] grants, permissions, and largesse can't help but reflect the
priorities of those other levels of government. They absolutely don't reflect what
different cities have or their differing needs and opportunities at any given time. In
reality, municipalities do not march in step with each other. In Canada, they are forced
to act like groups of puppets that are fastened to the same sets of controlling strings.'56
While municipal finances remain central, the political emphasis
on the need for improved (or at least new) tools for city governance
should be emphasized. Although the call for new tools may often, as
Mayor Lastman's comments at the same meeting indicate, come down
to a need for financing options, we believe that the choice to articulate
the problem in this way is itself significant. Perhaps Jacobs' comment
above, that Canadian cities are subject to a uniform set of controlling
strings, is instructive. The comment echoes a 1976 report by the
Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, entitled Puppets on
a Shoestring The Effects on Municipal Government of Canada's
'54 Ibid. at 13-14.
'5 Ibid. at 6.
156 Ibid.
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System of Public Finance.'57 The report, while discussing the issue of
tools, emphasized the fiscal crisis facing Canadian municipalities. The
recent movement of the metaphor away from finances toward the
centrality of legal tools was at the core of the city charter debate.
B. A Key Concern: Tools for Global Competitiveness
As articulated within this debate, the need for legal tools stems
from Canadian cities' need to become (and remain) globally
competitive, and to compete with major U.S. cities. 5 ' Similarly, Keil and
Young's analysis of the Toronto campaign highlights the "globalization"
concerns that animate the city charter movement.'59 As they indicate,
the politics of municipal autonomy are underwritten by a latent anxiety
over Toronto's colonial origins and its ability to face the challenges of a
global economy. They write, as follows:
There [is] a shared sense that the restructuring of the municipal governance regime in
Toronto, be it through a charter or otherwise, is a necessary reaction to the pressures
brought on by globalization .... The current legal and political framework - born in a
colonial and mostly rural Canada - was deemed insufficient or even detrimental to the
needs that Toronto would encounter through globalization.1"
The situation is particularly dire: as suggested at a symposium
of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Canada is the only G7
country without an "Alpha World City," making it less likely that the
country as a whole will be heard globally."'
This emphasis on "the global" (echoing Saskia Sassen's
influential research on the expanding list of global cities'62 ) remains a
core element of arguments in favour of a Toronto city charter, which
would link Canada's prosperity to the ability of its largest cities to
157 Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Puppets on a Shoestring. The
Effects on Municipal Government of Canada's System of Public Finance (Ottawa: Canadian
Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1976).
158 Supra note 150 at 11.
159 Roger Keil & Douglas Young, "A Charter for the People? A Research Note on the
Debate About Municipal Autonomy in Toronto" (2003) 39 Urb. Affairs Rev. 87 [Keil & Young,
"Charter"].
160 Ibid. at 95-96.
161FCM, "Urban Century," supra note 7 at 4.
162 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, 2d ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001).
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"compete on the nation's behalf in the global marketplace."' 163 Toronto,
as Keil suggests, "appears as an almost denationalized throughput node
of a global economy."" This emphasis on global competitiveness is, of
course, part of a much broader governmental array of urban neo-
liberalism, in which lean, accountable, and local government is
combined with the policing of marginal populations, thereby drawing
together left and right politics in an effort to promote a "competitive
city.
165
But if the need for global competitiveness is a key focus of
newspaper reports and political statements, the solution is often said not
to require additional revenue for municipalities precisely because of the
neo-liberal nature of this discourse. What is instead imagined is that
Toronto's competitiveness can be ensured, not through additional
taxation (imagined as potentially wasteful), but through new legal tools
to manage its own affairs. For instance, the Toronto Board of Trade
makes it clear that in addition to enhanced resources and immediate
investment in infrastructure, what is first required is a new governance
plan that emphasizes local accountability, transparency, and "good
decision-making,"' 166 and in that respect Toronto must learn from other
"competitor cities" worldwide. Similarly, for the city's chief
administrative and financial officers, not only will "the right tools ...
make a difference," but "the right tools are making a difference
153 Mayors' Summit Communiqu6, "Canada Needs Competitive Hub Cities" (23 January
2004) at 1, online: <http://www.canadascities.ca/pdf/mayorsummitcom_012304.pdf>; Chief
Administrative Officer, City of Toronto, "Towards a New Relationship with Ontario and Canada"
(Staff Report to Policy and Finance Committee, 6 June 2000) at 1, online:
<http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/ourcity/newrelation.pdf> [CAO, "Towards a New Relationship"];
FCM, "Urban Century," supra note 7; James Milway & Jen Nelles, "Opportunities for Improving
Municipal Governance in Ontario: A Discussion Paper" (June 2003), online: Institute for
Competitiveness and Prosperity <http://www.competeprosper.ca/research/ReportOnMunicipal
Government_190603.pdf>.
64 Roger Keil, "'Common Sense' Neoliberalism: Progressive Conservative Urbanism in
Toronto, Canada" (2002) 34 Antipode 578 at 592 [Keil, "'Common Sense' Neoliberalism"]. See
also Roger Keil, Los Angeles: Globalization, Urbanization, and Social Struggles (Chichester, NY:
J. Wiley, 1998).
16 Keil, "'Common Sense' Neoliberalism," ibid. at 595-96; Keil & Young, "Charter," supra
note 159 at 88.
1 Toronto Board of Trade, Strong City, Strong Nation: Securing Toronto's Contribution
to Canada (June 2002) at 21, online: Toronto Board of Trade <http://www.
bot.com/assets/StaticAssets/Documents/PDF/StrongCityRpt.pdf>.
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elsewhere." '67 And as the city's background report states, options like
"Home Rule" in some U.S. cities (which grants some discretionary
authority independent of state legislatures), the constitutional
recognition of cities as a level of government in many European
countries, and the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union's
Treaty of Maastricht, give evidence that "[a] city's legislative toolkit
helps or hinders the city's flexibility, creativity and nimbleness in solving
problems in a rapidly changing environment." '168
C. Toronto and the City Charter Debate
On 7 July 2000, the Toronto Star reported that on the previous
day, city council voted 52-1 "to demand special charter status and put an
end to what it sees as provincial government interference in its
affairs." '169 There was debate over whether to place a question about
seeking charter status on the civic election ballot, even if such a question
would violate a newly passed provincial regulation. And during the
course of the debate, Mayor Lastman-who less than a year earlier
publicly suggested that Toronto perhaps should become a province 171_
emphasized that as part of a city charter, Toronto would also hope to
enjoy part of the provincial gas and sales taxes.
Controversy over the idea of a city charter is, at one level,
surprising. As John Barber pointed out in The Globe and Mail, a city
charter in and of itself provides no greater municipal autonomy than any
other act.' 7' But the controversy is rife with symbolism. As Barber
67 Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Financial Officer, City of Toronto, "The time is
right for new relationships with Ontario and Canada" in Towards a New Relationship with Ontario
and Canada: Background Reports (Chief Administrator's Office, June 2000) at 6, online:
<http://www.toronto.ca/ourcity/citycharterrepl.pdf>.
'68 Chief Administrative Officer, City of Toronto, "Comparison of Powers and Revenue
Sources of Selected Cities" in Towards a New Relationship, ibid. at 1-2. See also Federation of
Canadian Municipalities, "Early Warning: Will Canadian Cities Compete? A Comparative
Overview of Municipal Government in Canada, the United States and Europe" (Report prepared
for the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, May 2001) at 5-10, online:
<http://www.fcm.ca/english/documents/compete.pdf>, and see also FCM, "Urban Century," supra
note 7 at 8.
169 P. Moloney, "Council demands new status for city; charter depends on approval by
province" Toronto Star(7 July 2000) B1.
"
7 0Keil & Young, "Charter," supra note 159 at 91.
J71 j. Barber, "Giving city charter status won't provide power it craves" The Globe andMail
(22 November 2000) A24.
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suggests, "the charter campaign becomes purely symbolic - a defiant
dream for the political class, a sharpened stick that Mel [Lastman] can
use to poke Mike [Harris] at opportune moments. 17 2
If the city charter campaign is part of a broader symbolic
politics, where did it originate and what are its goals? A pivotal moment
occurred in 1999 when Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman suggested to
reporters that Toronto should become its own province, thereby putting
the question of municipal autonomy, and city state status, on the
radar.173 As Keil and Young argue,'74 this campaign needs to be
understood within the broader debates over globalization, municipal
restructuring, and urban neo-liberalism discussed above. In their
excellent overview of the specific history of Toronto's city charter
campaign, they suggest that its roots can be traced to the city's 1970s
civic reform movement, 75 and that in recent years it is the
amalgamation of Toronto, with the resulting political and financial
fallouts that was the proximate cause, and spur, of this campaign.
These politics were evident when a possible city charter was
raised in a May.2000 Toronto city council meeting. Focusing mainly on
the downloading of costs by the Ontario government as a result of
amalgamation-and briefly noting that global trends encourage the
development of city states-city councillors sought to have staff prepare
a report on a possible referendum for Toronto to separate from
Ontario. 176 And it is in this city-provincial context that an amendment to
the motion was passed, according to which city staff were also to
examine "the issue of 'Charter Cities' and any other alternative deemed
appropriate to halt the provincial download."'77
The staff report prepared in June 2000 recommended that city
council endorse a new relationship with the federal and provincial
government, including the request to become a charter city, and that a
172 ibid.
"
3 Keil & Young, -"Charter," supra note 159.
174 Ibid. at 88-89.
17' By creating a Minister of State for Urban Affairs, the federal government in the 1970s
sought to create direct links with municipalities, but was unsuccessful for want of provincial
support. See City Solicitor, City of Toronto, "Powers of Canadian cities - the legal framework"
(June 2000, updated October 2001) at 10, n. 3.
7 Toronto City Council, Minutes of the Council of the City of Toronto (9-11 May 2000) at
87-88.
7 Ibid. at 91-92.
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"Team Toronto" be created.178 It is most interesting that this report,
though focusing on the new challenges faced by Toronto and its need to
compete with other North American cities in the twenty-first century,
notes that city charters are also an older Canadian technology for
governing cities, beginning with the charter for Saint John, New
Brunswick, in 1785, Montreal, and continuing more recently, with
Vancouver. 179 But this report called for a "custom built" charter that
would provide "recognition of Toronto as an 'order of government' with
the right to be consulted in advance on any provincial legislation, policy,
program or other action that would impact the City"; either a U.S.-style
Home Rule arrangement, by which the city would enjoy similar powers
to those granted to the provinces by the Constitution Act 1867, or
provincially defined "spheres of power," within which Toronto has
"natural person powers to act independently"; confirmation that the city
charter cannot be changed by mere provincial regulation; the ability to
raise money through public-private partnerships, tax incentives,
financing agreements, and the like; and, the ability for Toronto to
negotiate directly with the federal government.18 °
The report reiterated that much of what it sought could already
be found in other jurisdictions: if the idea of a charter had deep
historical roots in Canada, many of the powers it sought could be found
in the United States or other Canadian cities. And in advocating the
pursuit of charter status, the report recommended against deeper
constitutional change; if Toronto could become "a responsible and
accountable order of government with rights and responsibilities," this
"would not require secession or elevation to provincial status, both of
which would entail insurmountable constitutional hurdles."'' 1 Toronto's
secession from Ontario-or from Canada-would invariably require
provincial approval.'82
'
78 CAO, "Towards a New Relationship," supra note 163 at 1-2.
" See e.g. P. Kenward, "The British Columbia Community Charter: What is going on and
what does it mean for you? Part 3" McCarthy Tdtrault LLP Legal Update, June 2003, online:
McCarthy Tetrault LLP <http://www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/publication.asp?pubcode= 1350#>.
"
8 0CAO, "Towards a New Relationship," supra note 163 at 4-5.
181 Ibid. at 6.
'82 City Solicitor, supra note 175 at 8-9.
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The very idea of becoming an "order of government" that is not
constitutionally enshrined is, of course, murky. 8 3 Perhaps, as the
Federation of Canadian Municipalities suggests, the point was that a
charter "might require the Province to relate to the City as if it were an
autonomous, accountable order of government." '84 As one councillor
suggested: "Wouldn't that be a wonderful way to kick off a charter
campaign? I would reinforce this campaign by doing road repairs
around Queen's Park. Cut off their toilets. Repair the sewers. Let them
find out what real war is.' 85
This emphasis on tools and powers, then, allows the charter
proposal to gain currency from a wide range of supporters, whether on
economic, infrastructural, or political grounds.186  The charter
movement, with Toronto at its core (and buttressed by the fact that
Vancouver was recently granted a charter, with some fanfare but
perhaps less political strife), prompted the Federation of Canadian
Municipalities to endorse a template for writing charters generally.'87
This has spurred a wide range of proposals for what a Toronto
charter would include. The most publicized is the "Greater Toronto
Charter, '  underwritten by urban advocate Alan Broadbent, which
emphasizes principles of democratic governance, as defined by
subsidiarity (as we document in Part III, above, a principle that has a
183 Keil and Young note that in Canada, greater municipal autonomy could be achieved by
a constitutional amendment rendering municipalities a third order of government, with other
options including broadly written municipal acts or city charters that can provide autonomy and
symbolic value: Roger Keil & D. Young, "Municipal Autonomy? A Sketch of Local State Rescaling
in Canada at the Beginning of the 21st Century" (2003) [unpublished].
' Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Model Framework for a City Charter(2002) at 3
[emphasis added], online: Federation of Canadian Municipalities <http://www.canadascities.ca/pdf/
model_ framework.pdf>.
I Moloney, supra note 169, quoting Councillor Howard Moscoe (North York Spadina).
86 See Keil & Young, "Charter," supra note 159 at 91.
"I7 Toronto, City Clerk, "Establishing a New Relationship with the Federal and Provincial
Governments - Progress Report on Toronto's Initiatives" (Clause embodied in Report No. 12 of
the Policy and Finance Committee, adopted by City of Toronto Council 30 July-i August 2002)
[Toronto City Clerk, "Progress Report"]. This endorsement of Charter autonomy was met by
others, including the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, the Mayors of Canada's five largest
cities (C5) and the Toronto Board of Trade, with calls for urban reform coming from the United
Way of Greater Toronto, TD Bank, and others (ibid.).
188 "The Greater Toronto Charter (2001)" in Ideas That Matter, Towards a New City of
Toronto Act Greater Toronto Charter (Toronto: Zephyr Press, 2005) 40, online:
<http://www.ideasthatmatter.com/cities/CityOfrorontoActJune2005.pdf>.
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precarious status, at best, in Canadian law) and fiscal accountability. A
populist and neo-liberal approach to governance underwrites this model
charter, which emphasizes Toronto as "an order of government that is a
full partner of the Federal and Provincial Governments of Canada" ' 9
and accountable to local citizens. Reflecting the arguments presented by
Jane Jacobs earlier in this part, this model charter identifies global
urbanization as a key issue and emphasizes the need for Canadian cities
to compete with others internationally. And, among other benefits, it
notes the "symbolic value [of a charter] as an identifier of the
uniqueness metropolitan cities bring to a nation state," 9' underscoring
the view that economic globalization has rendered cities the key site of
both democracy and prosperity.
Within the City of Toronto it is clear that, at least at a rhetorical
and normative level, attaining a charter is not purely an issue of
resources. As the City of Toronto's charter strategy suggests:
The case for change is best advanced by the merits of the argument for modern powers
and resources to equip a modern city with appropriate and necessary tools to carry out
twenty-first century urban government responsibilities .... [A]ccess to sustainable,
appropriate and adequate financial resources is an urgent and critical issue, but the case
for a new relationship is not only about money. It is just as much about having the agility
and flexibility to make decisions in a complex and rapidly changing urban
environment.' 9
And yet, history shows that charters, while perhaps symbolically
mobilized in current political struggles, can be as much a tool of royal
control as an instrument of U.S.-style republican home rule. Even in the
Toronto Star, which has tirelessly supported the campaign for greater
autonomy for the city and for a city charter, a story in July 2000 noted
that despite Toronto's fascination with the charter enjoyed by Saint
John, New Brunswick, an interview with the Mayor of Saint John
suggested some caution: "I don't know that it does all that much for us
today," she said in a frank telephone interview. "I've heard Toronto is
interested in this, but I don't think you're going to get anything (from a
9 1Ibid, art. 1.
1'9 Avana Capital Corporation, Towards a Greater Toronto Charter (2000) at 2, online:
Ideas That Matter <http://www.ideasthatmatter.com/cities/TwdsCharter.pdf>.
'9' Toronto City Clerk, "Progress Report," supra note 187 at 4.
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charter) that the province can't override .... Our lawyers tell us that
(regardless of the charter) the province can do what it wants .... "192
Regardless of whether a charter would, in fact, provide
additional tools that could not be had through a more expansive
municipal act, achieving charter status was for a few years the brass ring
for Toronto to grasp. As a perceptive story in Toronto's Eye Weekly
points out, this is so whatever it might mean-whether it be John
Nunziata suggesting that "constitutional status" is needed, Tom Jakobek
arguing that "[ilt's a dollars-and-cents thing," Barbara Hall stating that
"I don't want to get hung up on terms like 'charter'," or Mayor David
Miller concluding that: We need a charter. We need the province to
review the Municipal Act so we have natural person powers." '93 And
perhaps the passion it garners is equally understandable-as Markham
Mayor Dan Cousens concluded about a potential Toronto charter, "I
love it.'
19 4
D. A Charter by Stealth ?
I am optimistic Dalton McGuinty will understand this. He's from
a big city.
-Mayor David Miller
196
With the election of the provincial Liberal government and a
new city mayor, the municipal autonomy movement appears to be re-
energized. A joint task force between the city and the province has been
set up to "Review the City of Toronto Act, 1997 and other Private
(Special) Legislation pertaining to Toronto."'97 On 17 September 2004,
Premier Dalton McGuinty delivered a speech to the Big City Mayors
Summit, pledging to introduce a modernized City of Toronto Act by the
end of 2005, and to consider giving Toronto the "tools it needs in the
'
92 T. Walkom, "City charter could be a curse" Toronto Star(18 July 2000) A17.
W9- . Norvell, "Charter, anyone? Securing the designation other large cities have could
cure our ills" Eye Weekly(16 October 2003).
'
9 4 D. Stein, "Show of muscle by urban Toronto" Toronto Star(17 August 2000) A27.
'%Norvell, supra note 193, quoting Mayor David Miller.
1 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "Final Terms of Reference: Joint Ontario-
City of Toronto Task Force" (23 September 2004), online: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing <http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/nts1_21835_1 .html>.
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global economy" to establish a new relationship with the federal
government, and to make the city more sustainable, autonomous, and
accountable.'98 Premier McGuinty has publicly supported the types of
arguments made by Toronto chartists by stating that Toronto is
governed by a "legislative and fiscal straitjacket that would baffle
Houdini,"'99 and echoing Margaret Thatcher's famous claim that there is
"no such thing as society" through his following suggestion: "You don't
live and work and raise your family in a province; you do so in a city, and
as a subset of that, you do so in a neighbourhood.""2 °
But if the municipal autonomy movement is revitalized, a
Toronto charter, and its symbolic cachet, may have been abandoned.
The city is no longer focusing on a charter but is instead seeking special
powers to be incorporated into the City of Toronto Act. The irony is
that this act was the mechanism for creating the Toronto megacity, and
the spur for the charter itself-an irony surely not lost on either the city
or the province. And in the interim, Toronto has left the Association of
Municipalities of Ontario-an organization that is now conducting
independent talks with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing-
to seek additional powers within the Ontario Municipal Act. Any
amendments achieved by the AMO would likely be ones that Toronto
would equally seek to incorporate in a revised City of Toronto Act.
As with so many successful social movements, Toronto's city
charter movement may be a short-lived campaign with long-lasting
effects. Having energized citizens and municipal officials, municipal
autonomy is now being pursued through conventional paths, which may
reflect a process of growing up for the city and the province alike.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Is there a new deal for Canadian cities with respect to legal
tools? The variability of municipal law across Canada (and even within a
single province) makes it difficult to generalize. About the only thing
that is clear, and unlikely to change in the short term, is that talk about
198 Dalton McGuinty, "Address to the Big City Mayors summit" (17 September 2004),
online: Government of Ontario <http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/Product.asp?ProductlD
=303>.
,99 J. Honderich, "Let's not drop ball on Toronto Act" Toronto Star (18 November 2004)
A28.
2
w Royson James, "McGuinty vows to help T.O." Toronto Star(28 December 2002) A19.
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the new deal that. pervades political rhetoric and government and
municipal reports has not resulted in major legal, and especially
statutory, differences. This is further evident in the recent report of the
Joint Ontario-City of Toronto Task Force."' l Despite the report's
prosaic title, "Building a 21st Century City," and recommendations of
broad powers for Toronto, the city's ability to pass bylaws remains
closely regulated. According to the taskforce's proposals, if "a city by-
law were to run counter to provincial interests," the province would
have "the ability to temporarily suspend it pending a legislative
review."2 ' This raises doubt as to the broad and permissive municipal
powers being proposed.
And yet rhetoric and largely symbolic initiatives often end up
having real effects, especially politically. If enough people believe, for
instance, that when a city gets its own charter something important has
happened, then the charter may well do more to increase the city's
powers than a purely legal analysis would suggest. Like mechanical
tools, legal tools have limitations, but a certain creativity and
unpredictability is inherent in the complex process through which
officials,; courts, and citizens put the law's tools to various uses. One
notable instance of this is found in Toronto's sudden abandonment of its
campaign for charter status in favour of a less showy and legally more
simplistic plan to have the province amend the amalgamation law, the
City of Toronto Act.
Keeping in mind this caveat about politico-legal creativity, which
forecloses any definitive predictions about the legal future, we now turn
to some of the key developments that our research has documented.
The first is a third level of government. The campaign promoted
by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and others to have
municipal government recognized as a third level of government is
unlikely to succeed given the basic architecture of the Canadian
constitution. The frequent citation in municipal reports and- urban
studies of the language of "subsidiarity" introduced into Canadian law
in Spraytech, however, especially if connected to federal infrastructure
and transportation grants given directly to cities, may lay a foundation
201 Joint Ontario-City of Toronto Task Force, Building a 21st Century City - Final Staff
Report (November 2005), online: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing
<http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/page-attachments/Library/l/3523728-toronto.pdf>.
202 Ibid. at 3-4.
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for a shift toward recognizing the municipal function as de facto
governmental. What needs to be resolved is whether this principle of
"subsidiarity" will become further institutionalized, and how courts will
reconcile a principle of "local distinctiveness and population diversity"
with Canada's political and constitutional structure.
Second is the end of prescribed powers. The "spheres of
jurisdiction" approach used by numerous provincial governments to
grant powers to municipalities with a more flexible form has not brought
about the sudden death of the Dillon doctrine, especially in Ontario,
where micromanagement of municipal decision making coexists with
some new, flexible powers (used for example by the city of Toronto in its
pesticide bylaw). Furthermore, while courts have recognized the general
legislative intention to move away from the laundry list approach, there
is no reason to expect that more flexible powers imply more power. The
City of Calgary can now regulate taxi plates without the particular
entity-plates, or taxis-being mentioned in the relevant statute, but the
city has no greater powers to regulate the industry now than it exercised
prior to 1994. Similarly, city charters can be a vehicle for autonomy and
empowerment, but can also be prescriptive and limiting.
Third is the question of cities versus municipalities. What to
urban studies specialists, economists, and sociologists seems like a
serious (provincial) failure to develop legal tools that reflect basic socio-
economic processes is compounded by the recent federal move away
from the "new deal for cities." The amorphous concept of "community"
used by the federal government, which is the political equivalent of the
general concept of the municipal corporation, is likely to hamper those
who are actively developing creative solutions to problems that are
specific to cities, from policies favouring public transit to licensing large
apartment buildings to building homeless shelters.
Fourth is accountability, but to whom? Neo-liberal and neo-
conservative political movements claimed that governments in Canada,
including municipal councils, needed to be reined in and made
accountable. Accountability is not a neo-liberal invention, however;
Dillon was a great promoter of municipal accountability and
transparency, with large ratepayers featuring prominently in his model.
Everyone can agree on the need for accountability. But there Js less
clarity and less consensus if one asks, accountability to whom? Our
analysis of the Ontario Municipal Act shows that the envisioned
accountability is often a matter of being accountable to the provincial
government that "creates" municipalities (as the act puts it) more than
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to citizens. Micromanagement of everyday municipal decision making
coexists with the rhetoric of "empowerment" and flexible powers. And
the mechanisms put in place in the name of accountability to citizens-
not only in that act but also through the zoning and planning machinery
controlled by the OMB-often favour middle class, educated property
owners, putting real obstacles in the path of democratic municipal
policies such as inclusive zoning.
Fifth is competition between cities, and the potential of star
status for some. Whether in the context of the "new deal for cities" or
city charter campaigns, Canadian cities are often finding themselves in
competition with one another, with the largest cities arguing that they
require unique status and powers. This raises the question of whether
some cities will gain increased powers, while smaller cities will be left
with less bargaining power in the process.
Cities and their citizens continue to face challenges, many of
legal origin, as they seek to address the mounting socio-economic (and
fiscal) crises of our post-welfare state. It is clear that neither new, more
rational municipal acts nor popular tools such as city charters, will
necessarily create a better legal field within which to develop creative
solutions that suit specific cities. On the other hand, the legal changes of
the past decade do contain some positive possibilities. The extent to
which these possibilities become reality cannot be predicted. However,
given that many municipalities managed to creatively find legal tools
within the highly limiting context of the old, Baldwin Act-style municipal
legislation, it is possible to feel at least somewhat confident that creative
uses of legal technologies will be devised.
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